# NEG CARDS

# 1

**Topical affirmatives must expand ECONOMIC institutional trade**

**Celik ‘11**. Arda Can Celik. MA Politics & Intl Studies, Uppsala University. “Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies.” Pg. 11

Introduction **Economic engagement policies** are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to **deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence**. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. **Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts**. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "**It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations** ".(p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.

**V—The plan does not EXPAND economic ties—it only CHANGES current ones.**

**“Increase” means to become larger or greater in quantity**

**Encarta 6** – Encarta Online Dictionary. 2006. ("Increase" http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861620741)

in·crease [ in krss ]  
transitive and intransitive verb  (*past and past participle* in·creased, *present participle* in·creas·ing, *3rd person present singular* in·creas·es)Definition**:**make or become larger or greater: **to become, or make something become, larger in number, quantity, or degree**  
noun  (*plural* in·creas·es)

**It’s a voter—**

**Ground—Any AFF could make a cosmetic change to status quo trade policy and avoid ALL generic link arguments based off increased economic ties.**

**Limits—Justifies millions of foreign affs at the middle of the year—we cant adequately prep without trade as a stable focal point**

# 2

**The struggle over the question of who counts as human is THE question of the debate—the system of colonialism instituted by European powers in the 15th and 16th centuries haunts the present in the form of coloniality—an epistemological structure that privileges the Western subject as the only legitimate expression of human knowledge. The question of Latin American engagement can only be answered when we first unsettle the coloniality of knowledge and being that has demarcated the majority of the world as subhuman populations given over to death.**

**Wynter 2003** (Sylvia, Professor of Romance Languages at Stanford University, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom¶ Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument,” CR: The New Centennial Review, 3.3 (2003) 257-337, MUSE)

THE ARGUMENT PROPOSES THAT **THE *STRUGGLE* OF OUR NEW MILLENNIUM WILL be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass** (i.e., **Western** bourgeois) **conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and** therefore the full cognitive and behavioral **autonomy of the human** species itself/ourselves. **Because** of **this overrepresentation**, which **is** **defined** in the first part of the title **as the Coloniality of Being/ Power/Truth/Freedom,** **any attempt to unsettle the coloniality of power will call for the unsettling of this** overrepresentation as the second and now purely secular form of what Aníbal Quijano identifies as the "**Racism/ Ethnicism complex," on whose basis the world of modernity was brought into existence from the fifteenth/sixteenth centuries onwards** (Quijano 1999, 2000), 2 **and** of what Walter **Mignolo identifies as the foundational "colonial difference" on which the world of modernity was to institute itself** (Mignolo 1999, 2000). 3 The correlated hypothesis here is that **all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change**, the sharply unequal **distribution of** the earth **resources** (20 percent of the world's peoples own 80 percent of its resources, consume two-thirds of its food, and are responsible for 75 percent of its ongoing pollution, with this leading to two billion of [End Page 260] earth's peoples living relatively affluent lives while four billion still live on the edge of hunger and immiseration, to the dynamic of overconsumption on the part of the rich techno-industrial North paralleled by that of overpopulation on the part of the dispossessed poor, still partly agrarian worlds of the 7South 4 )—these **are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle**. Central to this struggle also is the usually excluded and invisibilized situation of the category identified by Zygmunt Bauman as the "New Poor" (Bauman 1987). That is, as a category defined at the global level by refugee/economic migrants stranded outside the gates of the rich countries, as the postcolonial variant of Fanon's category of les damnés (Fanon 1963)—with this category in the United States coming to comprise the criminalized majority Black and dark-skinned Latino inner-city males now made to man the rapidly expanding prison-industrial complex, together with their female peers—the kicked-about Welfare Moms—with both being part of the ever-expanding global, transracial category of the homeless/the jobless, the semi-jobless, the criminalized drug-offending prison population. So that **if we see this category of the damnés that is internal to (and interned within) the prison system of the United States as the analog form of a global archipelago, constituted by the Third- and Fourth-World peoples of the so-called "underdeveloped" areas of the world**—most totally of all by the peoples of the continent of Africa (**now stricken with AIDS, drought, and ongoing civil wars, and whose bottommost place as the most impoverished of all the earth's continents is directly paralleled by the situation of its Black Diaspora peoples, with Haiti being produced and reproduced as the most impoverished nation of the Americas)—a systemic pattern emerges**. This pattern is linked to the fact that while in the post-sixties United States, as Herbert Gans noted recently, the Black population group, of all the multiple groups comprising the post-sixties social hierarchy, has once again come to be placed at the bottommost place of that hierarchy (Gans, 1999), with all incoming new nonwhite/non-Black groups, as Gans's fellow sociologist Andrew Hacker (1992) earlier pointed out, coming to claim "normal" North American identity by the putting of visible distance between themselves and the Black population group (in effect, claiming "normal" human status by distancing themselves from the group that is still made to occupy the nadir, [End Page 261] "nigger" rung of being human within the terms of our present ethnoclass Man's overrepresentation of its "descriptive statement" [Bateson 1969] as if it were that of the human itself), then **the struggle of our times, one that has hitherto had no name, is the struggle against this overrepresentation**. As a struggle whose first phase, the Argument proposes, was first put in place (if only for a brief hiatus before being coopted, reterritorialized [Godzich 1986]) by the multiple anticolonial social-protest movements and intellectual challenges of the period to which we give the name, "The Sixties." The further proposal here is that, although the brief hiatus during which the sixties' large-scale challenge based on multiple issues, multiple local terrains of struggles (local struggles against, to use Mignolo's felicitous phrase, a "global design" [Mignolo 2000]) erupted was soon to be erased, several of the issues raised then would continue to be articulated, some in sanitized forms (those pertaining to the category defined by Bauman as "the seduced"), others in more harshly intensified forms (those pertaining to Bauman's category of the "repressed" [Bauman 1987]). Both forms of "sanitization" would, however, function in the same manner as the lawlike effects of the post-sixties' vigorous discursive and institutional re-elaboration of the central overrepresentation, which enables the interests, reality, and well-being of the empirical human world to continue to be imperatively subordinated to those of the now globally hegemonic ethnoclass world of "Man." This, in the same way as in an earlier epoch and before what Howard Winant identifies as the "immense historical rupture" of the "Big Bang" processes that were to lead to a contemporary modernity defined by the "rise of the West" and the "subjugation of the rest of us" (Winant 1994)—before, therefore, the secularizing intellectual revolution of Renaissance humanism, followed by the decentralizing religious heresy of the Protestant Reformation and the rise of the modern state—the then world of laymen and laywomen, including the institution of the political state, as well as those of commerce and of economic production, had remained subordinated to that of the post-Gregorian Reform Church of Latin-Christian Europe (Le Goff 1983), and therefore to the "rules of the social order" and the theories "which gave them sanction" (See Konrad and Szelenyi guide-quote), as these rules were articulated by its theologians and implemented by its celibate clergy (See Le Goff guide-quote). [End Page 262] The Janus face of the emergence of Mignolo's proposed "**modernity/coloniality**" complementarity is sited here. As also is the answer to the why of the fact that, as Aníbal Quijano insists in his Qué tal Raza! (2000), the "idea of race" **would come to be "the most efficient instrument of social domination invented in the last 500 years."** In order for the world of the laity, including that of the then ascendant modern European state, to escape their subordination to the world of the Church, it had been enabled to do so only on the basis of what Michel Foucault identifies as the "invention of Man": that is, by the Renaissance humanists' epochal redescription of the human outside the terms of the then theocentric, "sinful by nature" conception/ "descriptive statement" of the human, on whose basis the hegemony of the Church/clergy over the lay world of Latin-Christian Europe had been supernaturally legitimated (Chorover 1979). While, if this redescription was effected by the lay world's invention of Man as the political subject of the state, in the transumed and reoccupied place of its earlier matrix identity Christian, **the performative enactment** of this new "descriptive statement" and its master **code of symbolic life and death**, as the first secular or "degodded" (if, at the time, still only partly so) mode of being human in the history of the species, **was to be effected only on the basis of what Quijano identifies as the "coloniality of power,"** Mignolo as the "colonial difference," and Winant as a huge project demarcating human differences thinkable as a "racial longue durée." **One of the major empirical effects of which would be "the rise of Europe" and its construction of the "world civilization" on the one hand, and, on the other, African enslavement, Latin American conquest, and Asian subjugation.**

**That’s particularly true for Cuba. Small tactical shifts in posture will be used by capitalist imperialists to strong-arm Cuba into accepting neoliberal globalization.**

**Nahem**, coordinator of Cuba Solidarity New York, **’10** [Ike, “Obama and Cuba: End of an Illusion”, March 16th, http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/03/obama-and-cuba-end-of-an-illusion/]

**Under** the new **Obama** Administration **there was a tactical diplomatic shift — a necessary retreat in form, more of a regrouping. The bellicose rhetoric and in-your-face confrontationism of the Bush years were ratcheted down** somewhat. Ambassadors were again exchanged with Venezuela and Bolivia. At the OAS Summit in Trinidad, Obama was photographed shaking hands with Hugo Chavez. Nevertheless, the aims of US policy were unchanged. (And, in recent months, alongside the shift to direct contention again with Cuba, there has been a ramping up of political hostility, demonization, and destabilization against the Hugo Chavez government in Venezuela. Corporate media outlets such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Post and the increasingly bellicose and conservative editorial page of the Washington Post have echoed, albeit more harshly, the US State Department government line painting a picture of Venezuela in utter economic and social chaos with a repressive government lashing out at dissent and “dropping the mask of democracy.”) **On Cuba Obama quickly adjusted US policy on** some **secondary questions – in the face of the** **mounting** Hemispheric and near-unanimous **international opposition to the** US economic, financial, and commercial **embargo** – **in order to more credibly defend and promote the core policy aim which remains the overturning of the revolutionary government, the destruction of the social relations and conquests of the Revolution, and the restoration of capitalism and US domination. Obama fulfilled his** campaign **promise to end existing travel restrictions** for Cuban-Americans; has eased somewhat the ability of some Cuban academics, musicians, artists, and scientists to visit the US **and** some similar US categories and individuals to legally travel to Cuba at the invitation of Cuban society. Also, **there has been a slight US liberalization** in granting so-called “people to people” licenses. **Nevertheless, so far, the Obama moves still are far from taking us to where the policy on exchanges and licenses was under Clinton** and the first several years of the George W. Bush Administration. **These anorexic measures, doled out with an eyedropper, are presented by Obama** and Clinton **as bold moves begging for a Cuban response. They are saying** in essence: **“We’ve done our bit, now you must basically commit suicide and end the Revolution in exchange.”**

**The affirmative’s economic engagement with Latin America is just one more manifestation of 500 years of coloniality—the promise of prosperity, democracy, and security is a toxic fantasy that obscures the trail of dead reaching back through time.**

**Mignolo 2005,** (Walter, Duke University, “THE IDEA OF LATIN AMERICA”, 2005, 6/28/13|Ashwin)

The **logic of coloniality can be understood as working through four wide domains of human experience**: (1) **the economic: appropriation of land, exploitation of labor, and control of finance**; (2) ¶ **the political: control of authority**; (3) **the civic: control of gender and sexuality**; (4) **the epistemic and the subjective/personal: control ¶ of knowledge and subjectivity**. The logic of coloniality has been in ¶ place from the conquest and colonization of Mexico and Peru until ¶ and beyond the war in Iraq, despite superficial changes in the scale ¶ and agents of exploitation/control in the past five hundred years of ¶ history. **Each domain is interwoven with the others, since appropriation of land or exploitation of labor also involves the control of ¶ finance, of authority, of gender, and of knowledge and subjectivity**.8¶ The operation of the colonial matrix is invisible to distracted eyes, ¶ and even when it surfaces, **it is explained through the rhetoric of ¶ modernity that the situation can be “corrected” with “development,” “democracy,” a “strong economy,” etc. What some will see as “lies**” ¶ from the US presidential administration **are not so much lies as part ¶ of a very well-codified “rhetoric of modernity,” promising salvation ¶ for everybody in order to divert attention from the increasingly ¶ oppressive consequences of the logic of coloniality. To implement ¶ the logic of coloniality requires the celebratory rhetoric of modernity**, as the case of Iraq has illustrated from day one. **As capital and ¶ power concentrate in fewer and fewer hands and poverty increases ¶ all over the word, the logic of coloniality becomes ever more ¶ oppressive and merciless**. Since the sixteenth century, the rhetoric ¶ of modernity has relied on the vocabulary of salvation, which was ¶ accompanied by the massive appropriation of land in the New ¶ World and the massive exploitation of Indian and African slave labor, ¶ justified by a belief in the dispensability of human life – the lives ¶ of the slaves. Thus, while some Christians today, for example, beat ¶ the drum of “pro-life values,” **they reproduce a rhetoric that diverts ¶ attention from the increasing “devaluation of human life” that the ¶ thousands dead in Iraq demonstrate**. Thus, **it is not modernity that will ¶ overcome coloniality, because it is precisely modernity that needs and produces ¶ coloniality**.¶ As an illustration, let us follow the genealogy of just the first of ¶ the four domains and see how the logic of coloniality has evolved ¶ in the area of land, labor, and finance. Below I will complement the brief sketch of this first quadrant by going deeper into the fourth ¶ one (knowledge and subjectivity) to show how knowledge transformed Anáhuac and Tawantinsuyu into America and then into ¶ Latin America and, in the process, how new national and subcontinental identities were created. But, first, **think of the massive ¶ appropriation of land by the Spanish and Portuguese, the would-be ¶ landlords of the Americas** during the sixteenth century, and the same ¶ by the British, French, and Dutch in the extended Caribbean (from ¶ Salvador de Bahia in Brazil to Charleston in today’s South Carolina, ¶ and including the north of Colombia and Venezuela in addition to ¶ the Caribbean islands). The **appropriation of land went hand in hand ¶ with the exploitation of labor** (Indians and African slaves) **and the ¶ control of finance (the accumulation of capital as a consequence of ¶ the appropriation of land and the exploitation of labor). Capital ¶ concentrated in Europe, in the imperial states, and not in the colonies.** You can follow this pattern through the nineteenth century ¶ when England and France displaced Spain and Portugal as leading ¶ imperial countries. The logic of coloniality was then reproduced, ¶ and, of course, modified, in the next step of imperial expansion into ¶ Africa and Asia.¶ **You can still see the same projects today in the appropriation of ¶ areas of “natural resources”** (e.g., in the Amazon or oil-rich Iraq). ¶ Land cannot be reproduced. You can reproduce seeds and other ¶ “products” of land; but land itself is limited, which is another reason ¶ why the appropriation of land is one of the prime targets of capital ¶ accumulation today. **The “idea” of Latin America is that of a large ¶ mass of land with a wealth of natural resources and plenty of cheap ¶ labor**. That, of course, is the disguised idea. What the rhetoric of ¶ **modernity touted by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Washington ¶ consensus would say is that “Latin” America is just waiting for its ¶ turn to “develop.”** You could also follow the exploitation of labor ¶ from the Americas to the Industrial Revolution to the movement ¶ of factories from the US to developing nations in order to reduce ¶ costs. **As for financial control, just compare the number and size of ¶ banks, for example, in New York, London, or Frankfurt, on the one ¶ hand, versus the ones in Bolivia, Morocco, or India, on the other**.¶ Thus, if we consider “America” from the perspective of coloniality (not modernity) and let the Indigenous perspective take center stage, another history becomes apparent. The beginning of the ¶ Zapatista “Manifesto from the Lacandon Jungle” gives us a ¶ blueprint:¶ We **are a product of 500 years of struggle: first against slavery**, ¶ then during the War of Independence against Spain; **then to ¶ avoid being absorbed by North American imperialism**, then to ¶ promulgate our constitution and expel the French empire from ¶ our soil; later the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz denied us the ¶ just application of the Reform laws and the people rebelled ¶ and leaders like Villa and Zapata emerged, poor men just like ¶ us. We **have** **been denied by our rulers the most elemental ¶ conditions of life, so they can use us as cannon fodder and ¶ pillage the wealth of our country**. They don’t care that we have ¶ nothing, absolutely nothing, not even a roof over hour heads, ¶ **no land, no work, no health care, no food or education.** Nor ¶ are we able to freely and democratically elect our political ¶ representatives, **nor is there independence from foreigners, nor ¶ is there peace or justice for ourselves and our children**.9¶ The “Manifesto from the Lacandon Jungle” precedes a long history ¶ rewritten from an Indigenous perspective (as opposed to the perspective of Mexican Creoles and Mestizos/as or French or US ¶ “experts” on Mexican and “Latin” American history). You may ¶ wonder whether the Indigenous people had a perspective because ¶ you imagine that history is history and what happened just happened, ¶ and argue that there are of course “different interpretations” but ¶ not “different perspectives.” Different interpretations presuppose a ¶ common and shared principle of knowledge and of the rules of the ¶ game, while different perspectives presuppose that the principles of ¶ knowledges and the rules of the game are geo-historically located ¶ in the structure of power of the modern colonial world. To show ¶ how this works, we need something such as “dependency theory” ¶ for the epistemological domain.10 “**Dependency theory” showed the ¶ differential of power in the economic domain insofar as it described ¶ a certain structure of differential power in the domain of the ¶ economy**. But it also proved the epistemic differential and the distribution of labor within an imperial geo-politics of knowledge in ¶ which political economy moved in one direction: from First to ¶ Third World countries and to contain Second World communism. ¶ In this sense, **dependency theory is relevant in changing the geopolitics of knowledge and in pointing toward the need for, and the ¶ possibility of, different locations of understanding and of knowledge ¶ production**.¶ The first part of the “Manifesto from the Lacandon Jungle” is a ¶ history and a description of the current economic and social situation in Chiapas, subdivided into the “First Wind” and the “Second ¶ Wind” in emulation of sixteenth-century Spanish chronicles of the ¶ New World. Cast in terms familiar to those conversant with globalization, the first wind is the wind from above and the second that ¶ from below. The declaration, then, outlines the direction of a project ¶ to rewrite the colonial history of modernity from the perspective ¶ of coloniality (instead of writing the history of coloniality from the ¶ perspective of modernity). This framing is subject to questions and ¶ criticisms by critical and inquisitive readers. **Professional historians ¶ could argue** that there is little historical rigor in this “pamphlet” ¶ and that what **we need is serious and rigorous histories** of how ¶ things “really” happened. Again, that argument assumes that the ¶ events carry in themselves their own truth and the job of the historian is to discover them. **The problem is that “rigorous historiography**” is more often than not complicitous with modernity (since ¶ the current conceptualization and practice of historiography, as a ¶ discipline, are a modern rearticulation of a practice dating back to ¶ – again – Greek philosophy). In that respect, the argument for disciplinary rigor **turns out to be a maneuver that perpetuates the myth ¶ of modernity as something separate from coloniality**. Therefore, if ¶ you happened to be a person educated in the Calmemac in Anáhuac ¶ and were quite far away from the legacies of the Greeks, it would ¶ be your fault for not being aware what civilized history is and how ¶ important it is for you.¶ Other criticisms may stem from the fact that the division of above ¶ and below still originates in the concept of the “above.” Indeed, it ¶ was the Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas who first described ¶ (but did not enact himself ) the perspective now being enacted by ¶ the Zapatistas. The most suspicious reader would add that it is SubComandante Marcos (a Mexican Mestizo who studied at the Universidad Autónoma de México) who narrates. Legitimate ¶ and interesting objections, these. However, such objections remain ¶ entangled in the web and the perspective of modernity; that is, in ¶ the expectations created by the hegemonic perspective of modernity ¶ itself. To unfold this last statement, let’s take another step and perhaps ¶ a detour and come back to **the inception of the logic of coloniality ¶ implied in the very idea of both “America” and “Latin” America**..4ever

**International agriculture agreemnts reinforce cycles of poverty – they play into aggressive domination rooted in the Western dominated elements of foreign policy**

**Ellinger-Locke 2011**

Maggie "FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IS A GENDERED ISSUE" Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 18 Buff. Envt'l. L.J. 157 J.D. from CUNY of Law in 2011, and her B.A. in ecofeminism from Antioch College. She is admitted into the Missouri Bar where she is a practicing criminal defense attorney MI

**Food production has been regulated through a series of international agreements**. In 1961, global North countries initiated the first international regime for the protection of plant varieties called the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties [\*170] of Plants (UPOV). 72 This convention, which has been amended several times, provides for plant breeders' rights (PBRs), giving plant breeders the sole right to create, reproduce, commercialize, and sell protected plant varieties. 73 In order to qualify for a PBR, a plant variety must be new, distinct, uniform, and stable. 74 Whether the variety qualifies as new depends not on whether it existed previously, but rather if it had been previously commercialized--that is, sold or marketed. 75 The 1991 amendment to the UPOV made optional a "farmers' privilege" exception that had been mandatory before and allowed farmers to save and exchange seed with other farmers. 76 Making this provision optional amounts to forbidding this practice by farmers in countries that choose to eliminate it, abandoning 10,000 years of farming practices.¶ Following these first regulatory efforts, **the oil crises of the 1970s caused the price of oil to spike beyond the reach of global South countries.** 77 **These price spikes forced such countries to procure loans from domestic banks so they could pay for the fuel and petroleum-based agricultural inputs**. 78 **Then, agricultural commodity prices fell just as interest rates on these loans spiked upward and these countries were unable to pay their debts**. 79 By the mid-1980s, two-thirds of African countries and **three-quarters of Latin American countries had accepted the structural adjustment programs commanded by the International Monetary Fund to restructure their existing economies and acquire new loan**s. 80 **Structural adjustment required countries to increase agricultural exports to create revenue that would be used to pay for their debt**. 81 **However, this only further flooded the market, driving down prices even more and continuing the cycle of poverty**. 82¶ [\*171] In 1983, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) promulgated the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (IUPGR), 83 the first international instrument that dealt with PGRs. The IUPGR declares that PGRs are part of the "heritage of mankind" and as such should be freely available. It **also recognized the concept of farmers' rights, meaning rights that arise "from the past, present and future contribution of farmers in conserving, improving, and making available plant genetic resources, particularly those in the centers of origin/diversity**." 84 **While this lip service was paid to the concept of farmers' rights, in effect it had little impact.** 85 However, it set the agenda for later international agreements.¶ The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 86 was adopted at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Earth Summit). 87 The CBD described PGRs as "sovereign national property" 88 ending the "common heritage" regime. It also stated that "informed consent" should be the standard for bilateral trade agreements pertaining to bioresource extraction to achieve "equitable benefit sharing." 89 The CBD was innovative in recognizing the rights of subnational groups, such as indigenous peoples, to partake in "benefit sharing." 90¶ However, such gains of the CBD are tempered by its commitment to market-place solutions. **The CBD takes the position that economic incentives are necessary to encourage global South countries to conserve their biodiversity rather than seeking out short-term solutions such as clear cutting for the creation of grazing land.** 91 The **purpose of encouraging this conservation was to enable corporate interests to exchange cash for** [\*172**] bioresources**. 92 **The contract regime would occur between private actors or private actors and government.** 93 **This profit-driven formula necessarily takes decision making power out of the hands of the poor.** Nonetheless, CBD has provided a framework on which a future agreement can be built.

**NAFTA, World Bank, IMF, WTO are the modern imperialist tools of the US**

**Banerjee 09** ( Subhabrata Bobby. HISTORIES OF OPPRESSION AND VOICES OF RESISTANCE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE TRANSLOCAL. REARTIKULACIJA #9, 2009. http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=612/)

**Old patterns of imperialism can be seen in the dominance of neoliberal policies in today’s global political economy. Transnational corporations often wield power over Third World countries through their enticements of foreign investment and their threats to withhold or relocate their investments**. **In return for foreign investments and jobs, corporations are able to extract from impoverished and often corrupt Third World governments tax concessions, energy and water subsidies, minimal environmental legislation, minerals and natural resources, a compliant labor force and the creation of Special Economic Zones** (SEZ) **which are** essentially **states of exception where the law is suspended in order for the business of economic extraction to continue**. Thus, rather than marking the death of the nation-state as some theorists of globalization like to argue**, the global economy is premised precisely on a system of nation-states.** **Neoliberal globalization can be seen as a marker for the final hegemonic triumph of the state mode of production.** The nation-state then is a fundamental building block of globalization**, in the working of transnational corporations, in the setting-up of a global financial system, in the institution of policies that determine the mobility of labor, and in the creation of the multi-state institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, NAFTA and WTO.** **The unprecedented scale of government intervention in response to the global financial crisis in Europe, North America, Asia and Australia has been such that neoconservative circles have invoked the specter of socialism and the fears of the emergence of a state-run economy.** Whether the financial crisis is indeed a reflection of the crisis in capitalism that could result in long-term re-engagement of the state in economic production or whether it will be business as usual remains to be seen, especially now that Germany, France and the United States appear to be coming out of recession. Imperial **formations in the contemporary political economy are more “efficient” in the sense that formal colonies no longer need to be governed.** **Imperialism has learned to manage things better by using the elites of the former colonies to do the governing, and the structural power of supranational institutions like the World Trade Organization, World Bank and International Monetary Fund and markets to do much of the imperial work**. I will describe three modes of management that enable accumulation by dispossession: management by extraction, management by exclusion and management by expulsion.

**Coloniality naturalizes a non-ethics of death and generalizes the condition of damnation—ongoing genocide, enslavement, ecological destruction and unending war is produced by and reproduces colonial epistmeologies.**

**Maldonado-Torres 2008** [Nelson. “Against War : Views from the Underside of Modernity”¶ Durham, NC, USA: Duke University Press, 2008. p 215-217¶ http://site.ebrary.com/lib/utexas/Doc?id=10217191&ppg=52]

Dussel, Quijano, and Wynter lead us to the understanding that what happened in the Americas was a transformation and naturalization of the non-ethics of war— which represented a sort of exception to the ethics that regulate normal conduct in Christian countries— into a more stable and long-standing reality of damnation, and that this epistemic and material shift occurred in the colony. **Damnation, life in hell, is colonialism: a reality characterized by the naturalization of war by means of the naturalization of slavery**, now justified in relation to the very constitution of people and no longer solely or principally to their faith or belief. **That human beings become slaves when they are vanquished in a war translates in the Americas into the suspicion that the conquered people**, **and** then **non-European peoples** in general, **are constitutively inferior and that therefore they should assume a position of slavery** and serfdom. Later on, this idea would be solidified with respect to the slavery of African peoples, achieving stability up to the present with the tragic reality of different forms of racism. Through this process, what looked like a “state of exception” in the colonies became the rule in the modern world. However, deviating from Giorgio Agamben’s diagnosis, one must say that **the colony**— **long before the concentration camp and the Nazi politics of extermination**— **served as the testing ground for the limits and possibilities of modernity**, thereby revealing its darkest secrets.61 **It is race, the coloniality of power, and its concomitant Eurocentrism** (and¶ not only national socialisms or expressed forms of fascism) **that allow the “state of exception” to continue to define ordinary relations in this**, our so-called postmodern **world**. **Race emerges within a permanent state of exception where forms of behavior that are legitimate in war become a natural part of the ordinary way of life.** In that world, an otherwise extraordinary affair becomes the norm and living in it requires extraordinary effort.62 **In the racial/ colonial world, the “hell” of war becomes a condition that defines the reality of racialized selves**, which Fanon referred to as the damnés de la terre (condemned of the earth). **The damné (condemned) is a subject who exists in a permanent “hell,”** and as such, **this figure serves** as the main referent or liminal other that guarantees **the continued affirmation of modernity as a paradigm of war.** **The hell of the condemned** is not defined by the alienation of colonized productive forces, but rather **signals the dispensability of racialized subjects,** that is, **the idea that the world would be fundamentally better without them.** **The racialized subject is ultimately a dispensable source of value, and exploitation is conceived in this context as due torture, and not solely as the extraction of surplus value**. Moreover, it is this very same conception that gives rise to the particular erotic dynamics that characterize the relation between the master and its slaves or racialized workers. **The condemned**, in short, **inhabit a context in which the confrontation with death and murder is ordinary. Their “hell” is** not simply “other people,” as Sartre would have put it— at least at one point— but rather **racist perceptions that are responsible for the suspension of ethical behavior toward peoples at the bottom of the color line.** **Through racial conceptions that became central to the modern self, modernity and coloniality produced a permanent state of war that racialized and colonized subjects cannot evade or escape**. **The modern** function of race and the **coloniality of power**, I am suggesting here, **can be understood as a radicalization and naturalization of the non-ethics of war in colonialism**.63 **This non-ethics included the practices of eliminating and enslaving certain subjects**— **for example, indigenous and black**— **as part of the enterprise of colonization.** From here one could as well refer to them as **the death ethics of war**. War, however, is not only about killing or enslaving; **it also includes a particular treatment of sexuality and femininity: rape**. **Coloniality** is an order of things that **places people of color within the murderous and rapist view of a vigilant ego**, and **the primary targets of this rape are women**. But **men of color are also seen through these lenses and feminized**, to become fundamentally penetrable subjects for the ego conquiro. **Racialization functions through gender and sex**, and the ego conquiro is thereby constitutively a phallic ego as well.64 Dussel, who presents this thesis of the phallic character of the ego cogito, also makes links, albeit indirectly, with the reality of war. And thus, in the beginning of modernity, before Descartes discovered . . . a terrifying anthropological dualism in Europe, the Spanish conquistadors arrived in America. The phallic conception of the European-medieval world is now added to the forms of submission of the vanquished Indians. “Males,” Bartolomé de las Casas writes, are reduced through “the hardest, most horrible, and harshest serfdom”; but this only occurs with those who have remained alive, because many of them have died; however, “in war typically they only leave alive young men (mozos) and women.”65 **The indigenous people who survive the massacre or are left alive have to contend with a world that considers them to be dispensable**. **And since their bodies have been conceived of as inherently inferior or violent, they must be constantly subdued or civilized**, **which requires renewed acts of conquest and colonization**. **The survivors continue to live in a world defined by war, and this situation is peculiar in the case of women.** As T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting and Renée T. White put it in the preface to their anthology Spoils of War: Women of Color, Cultures, and Revolutions: **A sexist and/or racist patriarchal culture and order posts and attempts to maintain, through violent acts of force if necessary, the subjugation and inferiority of women of color**. As Joy James notes, “**its explicit, general premise constructs a conceptual framework of male** [**and**/or **white**] **as normative in order to enforce a political [racial, economic, cultural, sexual] and intellectual mandate of male [and/or white] as superio**r.” The warfront has always been a “feminized” and “colored” space for women of color. Their experiences and perceptions of war, conflict, resistance, and struggle emerge from their specific racial-ethnic and gendered locations. “Inter arma silent leges: in time of war the law is silent,” Walzer notes. Thus, this volume operates from the premise that war has been and is presently in our midst.66 **The links between war, conquest, and the exploitation of women’s bodies are hardly accidental**. In his study of war and gender, Joshua Goldstein argues that conquest usually proceeds through an extension of the rape and exploitation of women in wartime.67 He argues that to understand conquest, one needs to examine: 1) male sexuality as a cause of aggression; 2) the feminization of enemies as symbolic domination; and 3) dependence on the exploitation of women’s labor— including reproduction.68 My argument is, first, that these three elements came together in a powerful way in the idea of race that began to emerge in the conquest and colonization of the Americas. My second point is that **through the idea of race, these elements exceed the activity of conquest and come to define what from that point on passes as the idea of a “normal” world**. As a result, the phenomenology of a racial context resembles, if it is not fundamentally identical to, the phenomenology of war and conquest. **Racism posits its targets as racialized and sexualized subjects that, once vanquished, are said to be inherently servile and whose bodies come to form part of an economy of sexual abuse, exploitation, and control**. The coloniality of power cannot be fully understood without reference to the transformation and naturalization of war and conquest in modern times. **Hellish existence in the colonial world carries with it both the racial and the gendered aspects of the naturalization of the non-ethics of war. “Killability” and “rapeability” are inscribed into the images of colonial bodies and deeply mark their ordinary existence**. Lacking real authority, **colonized men are permanently feminized and simultaneously represent a constant threat for whom any amount of authority**, any visible trace of the phallus is multiplied in a symbolic hysteria that knows no limits.69 Mythical depiction of the black man’s penis is a case in point: **the black man is depicted as an aggressive sexual beast who desires to rape women, particularly white women. The black woman, in turn, is seen as always already sexually available to the rapist gaze of the white, and as fundamentally promiscuous**. In short, **the black woman is seen as a highly erotic being whose primary function is fulfilling sexual desire and reproduction**. To be sure, **any amount of “penis” in either one represents a threat**, but in his most familiar and typical forms the black man represents the act of rape—“raping”—while the black woman is seen as the most legitimate victim of rape—“being raped.” **In an antiblack world black women appear as subjects who deserve to be raped and to suffer the consequences**— in terms of a lack of protection from the legal system, sexual abuse, and lack of financial assistance to sustain themselves and their families— **just as black men deserve to be penalized for raping, even without having committed the act**. Both “raping” and “being raped” are attached to blackness as if they form part of the essence of black folk, who are seen as a dispensable population. **Black bodies are seen as excessively violent and eroti**c, as well as being the legitimate recipients of excessive violence, erotic and otherwise.70 “**Killability” and “rapeability” are part of their essence**, understood in a phenomenological way. **The “essence” of blackness in a colonial anti-black world is part of a larger context of meaning in which the death ethics of war gradually becomes a constitutive part of an allegedly normal world.** In its modern racial and colonial connotations and uses, blackness is the invention and the projection of a social body oriented by the death ethics of war.71 This murderous and raping social body projects the features that define it onto sub-Others in order to be able to legitimate the same behavior that is allegedly descriptive of them. **The same ideas that inspire perverted acts in war— particularly slavery, murder, and rape— are legitimized in modernity through the idea of race and gradually come to be seen as more or less normal thanks to the alleged obviousness and non-problematic character of black slavery and anti-black racism**. To be sure, those who suffer the consequences of such a system are primarily blacks and indigenous peoples, but it also deeply affects all of those who appear as colored or close to darkness. In short, **this system of symbolic representations, the material conditions that in part produce and continue to legitimate it, and the existential dynamics that occur therein** (which are also at the same time derivative and constitutive of such a context) **are part of a process that naturalizes the non-ethics or death ethics of war. Sub-ontological difference is the result of such naturalization and is legitimized through the idea of race. In such a world, ontology collapses into a Manicheanism**, as Fanon suggested.72

**Our alternative is to delink from the current epistemic frame**

**Mignolo 09** (Walter, Professor of literature-Duke University, Ph.D. from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, academic director of [Duke in the Andes](http://www.aas.duke.edu/study_abroad/andes/index.php), an interdisciplinary program in Latin American and Andean Studies in Quito, Ecuador at Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador and the Universidad Politécnica Salesiana, “Epistemic Disobedience,¶ Independent Thought and¶ De-Colonial Freedom” ,Theory, Culture & Society 2009)

**ONCE UPON a¶ time scholars assumed that the knowing subject in¶ the disciplines is transparent, disincorporated from the known and¶ untouched by the geo-political configuration of the world in which¶ people are racially ranked and regions are racially configured.** **From a¶ detached and neutral point of observation** (that Colombian philosopher¶ Santiago Castro-Gómez (2007) describes as the **hubris of the zero point**), the¶ **knowing subject maps the world and its problems, classifies people and¶ projects into what is good for them**. **Today** that assumption is no longer¶ tenable, although there are still many believers. **At stake is indeed the¶ question of racism and epistemology** (Chukwudi Eze, 1997; Mignolo, forthcoming).¶ And once upon a time **scholars assumed that if you ‘come’ from¶ Latin America you have to ‘talk about’ Latin America; that in such a case¶ you have to be a token of your culture**. Such expectation will not arise if the¶ author ‘comes’ from Germany, France, England or the US. In such cases it¶ is not assumed that you have to be talking about your culture but can¶ function as a theoretically minded person. **As we know: the first world has¶ knowledge, the third world has culture; Native Americans have wisdom,¶ Anglo Americans have science**. **The need for political and epistemic delinking¶ here comes to the fore, as well as decolonializing and de-colonial¶ knowledges, necessary steps for imagining and building democratic, just,¶ and non-imperial/colonial societies.¶ Geo-politics of knowledge goes hand in hand with geo-politics of¶ knowing**. Who and when, why and where is knowledge generated (rather¶ than produced, like cars or cell phones)? Asking these questions means to¶ shift the attention from the enunciated to the enunciation. And by so doing,¶ turning Descartes’s dictum inside out: **rather than assuming that thinking¶ comes before being, one assumes instead that it is a racially marked body¶ in a geo-historical marked space that feels the urge or get the call to speak,¶ to articulate, in whatever semiotic system, the urge that makes of living¶ organisms ‘human’ beings.**¶ By setting the scenario in terms of geo- and body-politics I am starting¶ and departing from already familiar notions of ‘situated knowledges’. Sure,¶ all knowledges are situated and every knowledge is constructed. But that is¶ just the beginning. **The question is: who, when, why is constructing¶ knowledges** (Mignolo, 1999, 2005 [1995])? **Why eurocentered epistemology¶ carefully** **hidden** (**in the social sciences, in the humanities, in the natural¶ sciences and professional schools, in think tanks of the financial sector** and¶ the G8 or G20), its own geo-historical and bio-graphical locations Occidentales), **that created the conditions for Orientalism; distinguished the¶ South of Europe from its center** (Hegel) and, **on that long history, remapped¶ the world as first, second and third** during the Cold War. **Places of nonthought**¶ (of myth, non-western religions, folklore, underdevelopment involving¶ regions and people) **today have been waking up from the long process¶ of westernization.** The anthropos inhabiting non-European places discovered¶ that s/he had been invented, as anthropos, by a locus of enunciations¶ self-defined as humanitas.¶ Now, **there are currently two** kinds or **directions advanced by the former¶ anthropos who are** no longer claiming recognition by or inclusion in, the¶ humanitas, but **engaging in epistemic disobedience and de-linking from the¶ magic of the Western idea of modernity, ideals of humanity and promises of¶ economic growth and financial prosperity** (Wall Street dixit). One direction¶ unfolds within the globalization of a type of economy that in both liberal¶ and Marxist vocabulary is defined as ‘capitalism.’ One of the strongest advocates¶ of this is the Singaporean scholar, intellectual and politician Kishore¶ Mahbubani, to which I will return later. One of his earlier book titles carries¶ the unmistakable and irreverent message: Can Asians Think?: Understanding¶ the Divide between East and West (2001). Following Mahbubani’s own¶ terminology, this direction could be identified as de-westernization. Dewesternization¶ means, within a capitalist economy, that the rules of the game¶ and the shots are no longer called by Western players and institutions. The¶ seventh Doha round is a signal example of de-westernizing options.¶ The second direction is being advanced by what I describe as the decolonial¶ option. **The de-colonial option is the singular connector of a¶ diversity of de-colonials. The de-colonial path has one thing in common: the¶ colonial wound, the fact that regions and people around the world have been¶ classified as underdeveloped economically and mentally.** **Racism not only¶ affects people but also** regions or, better yet, **the conjunction of natural¶ resources needed by humanitas in places inhabited by anthropos**. **Decolonial¶ options have one aspect in common with de-westernizing arguments**:¶ **the definitive rejection of ‘being told’ from the epistemic privileges¶ of the zero point what ‘we’ are, what our ranking is in relation to the ideal¶ of humanitas and what we have to do to be recognized as such.** However,¶ **de-colonial and de-westernizing options diverge in one crucial and in -¶ disputable point: while the latter do not question the ‘civilization of death’¶ hidden under the rhetoric of modernization and prosperity, of the improvement¶ of modern institutions** (e**.g. liberal democracy and an economy¶ propelled by the principle of growth and prosperity**), **de-colonial options¶ start from the principle that the regeneration of life shall prevail over¶ primacy of the production and reproduction of goods at the cost of life** (life¶ in general and of humanitas and anthropos alike!). I illustrate this direction,¶ below, commenting on Partha Chatterjee’s re-orienting ‘eurocentered¶ modernity’ toward the future in which ‘our modernity’ (in India, in Central¶ Asia and the Caucasus, in South America, briefly, in all regions of the world¶ upon which eurocentered modernity was either imposed or ‘adopted’ by local¶ Mignolo – Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and . . . 3¶ actors assimilating to local histories inventing and enacting global designs)¶ **becomes the statement of interconnected dispersal in which de-colonial¶ futures are being played out**.¶ Last but not least, **my argument** doesn’t claim originality (‘originality’¶ is one of the basic expectations of modern control of subjectivity) but **aims¶ to make a contribution to growing processes of de-coloniality around the¶ world**. My humble claim is that **geo- and body-politics of knowledge has¶ been hidden from the self-serving interests of Western epistemology and that¶ a task of de-colonial thinking is the unveiling of epistemic silences of¶ Western epistemology and affirming the epistemic rights of the racially¶ devalued, and de-colonial options to allow the silences to build arguments¶ to confront those who take ‘originality’ as the ultimate criterion for the final¶ judgment.**

**And we must decolonize debate—Western epistemologies continue colonial schooling designed to reproduce coloniality—from the “moral project” of educating and civilizing the Indians to teaching of social Darwinism in the Congo. Decolonizing education requires not only an analysis of the knowledge, power, Eurocentrism, and political economy inherent in educational activities like debate but also foregrounding the possibility of epistemic resistance.**

**Shahjahan 2011** [Riyad Ahmed, Assistant Professor of Higher, Adult, and Lifelong Education (HALE) at Michigan State University. Ph.D. at the OISE/University of Toronto in Higher Education. “Decolonizing the evidence-based education and policy movement:¶ revealing the colonial vestiges in educational policy, research, and¶ neoliberal reform” Online publication date: 22 March 201, Journal of Education Policy, 26: 2,¶ 181 — 206 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2010.508176>]

Revisiting histories of colonial educational policy in schooling helps us contextualize¶ and demonstrate how evidence-based education, tied to high-stakes testing and¶ neoliberalism, reproduces past colonial ideologies with respect to developing colonized¶ labor. **Throughout European colonialism, schooling was not only used to colonize¶ the minds to force cultural assimilation or acceptance of colonial rule, but also to¶ produce a reservoir of subservient labor that would harvest and mine commodities for¶ the imperial economy.** For instance**, in North America, colonial schooling ‘introduced¶ the concept of forced labor as part of Indian education, transforming the ostensibly¶ “moral project” of civilizing Indians into a for-profit enterprise’** (Grande 2004, 13). In¶ boarding schools, **part of the most important feature of the colonialist curriculum ‘was¶ the** inculcation of the industrial or “**Protestant” work ethic’** (13). In **the Belgian¶ Congo, Darwin’s scientific racism was the dominant discourse among Belgian colonizers,¶ and it influenced their colonial educational policy.** For the Belgian government¶ and leaders of industry, **the Congolese was to learn in school a work ethos that clearly¶ catered to the economic endeavor, and to mold the Congolese playfulness and laziness¶ into a life of ‘progress,’ order and discipline** (Seghers 2004, 465). **In Hawaii, colonial¶ schools ‘became less a means of religious conversion and more a site for socializing¶ Hawaiian and immigrant children for work on the plantation’** (Kaomea 2000, 322). In¶ Africa in general, Urch notes: The demand for skilled native labor by the white settlers and commercial leaders caused¶ the colonial administrators to reevaluate the educational program of the missions.¶ **Education solely for proselytization was not considered sufficient to enable the colonies’¶ economy to expand**. **Government officials saw the need for an educational process that¶ would help to break down tribal solidarity and force the African into a money economy**.¶ (1971, 252)¶ In short, **colonial schooling played a significant role in disciplining the minds and**¶ **bodies of the colonized for imperial profit**.¶ Interestingly, when it came to ‘pillars of the curriculum,’ what was common¶ among many colonial environments, ‘were religion and the legendary “3Rs”¶ [Reading, (W)riting and “Rithmetic”]’ (Sjöström 2001, 79). These pillars of the¶ curriculum very much parallel, with a slight change, the curriculum that is tested via¶ PISA and TIMSS which concentrates on reading, math, and science. In the contemporary¶ context, science has replaced the pillar of religion in the curriculum. Also, in the¶ present context, **the neoliberal economy has replaced the old imperial economy**, **but**¶ **the objective for schooling still stays the same, which is to produce a labor force for**¶ **the global economy.** As Lipman points out, **these accountability reforms ‘certify that¶ students that graduate from’ schooling ‘will have [the] basic literacies and disciplined¶ dispositions’ needed for a global workforce** (2003, 340). **International organizations¶ such as the OECD and the World Bank, have replaced the old adage ‘protestant work¶ ethic’ of colonial schooling**, with the knowledge and skills to function in the knowledge¶ economy, such as literacy to manipulate information, problem solving, math, and¶ science (Spring 2009). In other words, like colonial schooling, **education via neoliberal¶ reform is working towards reproducing a labor force and objectification of the¶ colonized**. Ceasire’s argument of ‘thingification’ fits very well with the colonizing of¶ bodies in neoliberal educational reform. **Teachers, students, and education in general¶ are all objectified and reduced to commodities to serve the global economy**. To this¶ end, Lipman states: **Students are reduced to test scores, future slots in the labor market, prison numbers, and¶ possible cannon fodder in military conquests.** **Teachers are reduced to technicians and¶ supervisors in the education assembly line – ‘objects’ rather than ‘subjects’ of history**.¶ **This system is fundamentally about the negation of human agency**, **despite the good¶ intentions of individuals at all levels.** (2004, 179)¶ **Global colonialism continues with the evidence-based education movement,** as education¶ is increasingly reduced into standardized packages that can be sold in the global¶ marketplace, while at the same time **promoting a system of education that is focused¶ on training a skilled workforce that will operate in the global labor market (**Lipman¶ 2004; Berry 2008; Spring 2009; Rizvi and Lingard 2010). To this end, Fanon states:¶ I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my spirit filled¶ with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I found that I was an object¶ in the midst of other objects. (1967, 109).¶ **The desires and agencies of many teachers, students, and educational leaders are being¶ stripped away,** **while at the same time they are turned into ‘an object in the midst of¶ other objects’ through the neoliberal logic of evidence-based education**. In summary,¶ **the neoliberal agenda, currently dominant in education systems around the world, reproduces**¶ **colonial educational policies**. Within the evidence-based education movement, **the epistemic and material are not separate but are intertwined in colonial discourse¶ and history**. As this section demonstrates, **evidence-based education not only colonizes¶ education epistemologically, but also perpetuates materialist power relations and¶ disciplines bodies of the colonized to serve the global economy.¶** Concluding remarks and implications¶ [**U]nless educational reform happens concurrently with analysis of the forces of colonialism,¶ it can only serve as a insufficient Band-aid over the incessant wound of imperialism**.¶ (Grande 2004, 19)¶ Grande eloquently summarizes the intention behind this article, which is to offer a¶ conceptual map linking events of the colonial past with a present movement that¶ continues to perpetuate colonial discourses and practices within educational policy.¶ My hope is that the analysis presented in this paper provides an alteration in terms on¶ what is unsaid or left out in educational policy and bolsters a critical analysis of power¶ in educational policy. I argue in this paper that the evidence-based education movement¶ is very much tied to multiple colonial discourses, which can be traced back to a¶ colonial history that has simply been ignored in the literature. In other words, this article¶ challenges us to move beyond the confines of Eurocentrism and historical amnesia¶ to critically examine evidence-based education and to contextualize this movement¶ within colonial discourses and histories. It is my hope that this article demonstrates the usefulness of the anticolonial lens¶ in examining educational policy. **This framework foregrounds the intersections¶ between knowledge, power, Eurocentrism, colonial history, and political economy, in¶ educational policy**. **The epistemic, cultural, and material perspectives in anticolonial**¶ **thought are applicable to policy analysis**. This is evident in the way that ‘educational¶ research,’ ‘evidence,’ ‘curriculum,’ and ‘learning outcomes’ are being defined and¶ re-imagined in evidence-based education, as these are ultimately shaped by material¶ relations of power that are colonizing. For instance, common to any colonial¶ discourse is the rationale for purifying administration in the name of efficiency, and a¶ binaristic civilizing narrative is used in this regard. By naming and representing¶ education as a field in chaos, **evidence-based education proponents, with good intentions,¶ are justifying actions and measures to make education systems more evidencebased¶ and in turn standardize and rationalize complex educational processes.** As this¶ paper demonstrates, **many proponents of evidence-based education profess an¶ educational policy with the intention of improving learning for all students** (which¶ may be their full intent), **but their discourse continues to perpetuate colonized power**¶ **relationships**. In other words, **they are unknowingly striving to control and ‘tame’¶ education through evidence-based education.** **An anticolonial lens also reminds us how social hierarchies and knowledge¶ systems were used to justify colonial interventions with the objective of reshaping¶ society in order to exploit the labor and material resources of the colonized**, **and allow¶ for certain power relations to be legitimized.** **In the evidence-based education movement,**¶ **we see the mobilization of colonial discourse with regard to the way ‘evidence’**¶ **and ‘learning’ is being constructed and used to purify the production of knowledge to**¶ **meet neoliberal ends of education**. Furthermore, **the anticolonial lens reveals the¶ commodification, objectification, and dehumanization of bodies and knowledge¶ systems in colonial processes**. This article demonstrates how this ‘thingification’ occurs in evidence-based education for teachers, students, and educational leaders. An¶ anticolonial lens cannot separate the political economy from the epistemic issues. To¶ this end, this paper demonstrates how **evidence-based education is part of a neoliberal**¶ **agenda which is also tied to global colonialism and the production of colonized labor**.¶ In short**, an anticolonial lens helps to bring forward the social–historical–political¶ processes that stem from colonial relations of power and informs contemporary¶ knowledge production, validation, and dissemination in educational policy.** **An anticolonial lens also stresses that colonial discourses and material relations of¶ power are not absolute, and that the colonized also have discursive and material¶ agency**. To this end, one of the limitations of my analysis is that it overlooks the¶ agency among the colonized, and has presented evidence-based education as a monolithic¶ discourse with homogenizing effects, rather than a partial discourse that is¶ contested and lived differently from its intentions. Historically, and in present¶ contexts, imperialism and colonialism were never monolithic or unidirectional, and¶ the boundaries between colonizers and colonized were not clearly demarcated (see¶ Cooper and Stoler 1997; Young 2001; Bush 2006). Similarly, evidence-based education¶ is not an absolute, unidirectional discourse. **From an anticolonial lens, we need to¶ look for those sites of resistance and discrepancies to highlight the limitations/¶ inequities of evidence-based education and bring those struggles to the foreground**. To¶ this end, I will now discuss some examples of the ‘tensions’ and resistances to¶ evidence-based education. For instance, **in Canada, the British Columbia Teacher’s¶ Federation has led a campaign to resist the Foundations Skills Assessment** instituted¶ by the provincial government (http://www.bctf.ca/fsa.aspx). In Ontario, **African-¶ Canadian parents are frustrated with** the Toronto **public schooling system failing to¶ respond to the needs of Black youth and are** **demanding Africentric schools** from the¶ Toronto District School Board (Adjei and Agyepong 2009). **In the USA**, Fine et al.¶ (2007) describe, how **schools, communities, parents, and grandparents are engaged in¶ active resistance** to such accountability measures and schooling. **Chicago residents** of¶ Little Village **have launched an organizing campaign for a local high school dedicated¶ to culture, community, and activism**, which **culminated in a 19-day hunger strike** by¶ Latino high school students, educators, community organizers, residents, and even¶ grandmothers. Similarly, in **a California community**, largely populated by migrant¶ families, the school district, joined by nine other districts and civil rights organizations,¶ **sued the state over the improper use of English-language assessments to test¶ English Language Learners** and the sanctions they face under NCLB (Fine et al.¶ 2007). Teachers also have the agency to interpret, disseminate, and act on the information¶ based on such accountability policies (Lipman 2002; Ball 2003; Sloan 2007). Some¶ teachers have left the profession as an act of resistance because these accountability¶ trends no longer reflect their critical educational philosophy (McNeil 2000; Lipman¶ 2002; Ball 2003). Other **teachers enact resistance by subverting the official test-based¶ curriculum**. For instance, as one Chicago school teacher put it:¶ I think that we are having a rough time, that sometimes we may lean a little bit more¶ towards CPS policies and other times we lean a little bit more to ‘screw CPS’ and focus¶ on critical thinking skills. (Lipman 2002, 392)¶ Some still display ambivalence towards teaching for the test for the purpose of¶ surveillance: I have mixed feelings about it … I think it’s how we interpret the results. If we use it to¶ say our school is better than yours, then I don’t want to do it. If we use it so that we can¶ help the teachers program better for the kids, then that is more useful as a tool. (Canadian¶ Grade 3 teacher, cited in Childs and Fung 2009, 9)¶ In short, **teachers, students, parents, families, and community activists have demonstrated¶ the agency to negotiate and contest these colonial discourses in every day¶ practice**. Accountability reforms, tied with evidence-based education, depending on¶ context, have also had multiple effects on schools and curricula, and also have critics¶ from within. Scholars have noted how **the colonizing effects of accountability reform¶ on schooling and resistance to these reforms depend on the context and the questions¶ of race, class, language, and localized policies** (Lipman 2002, 2003; Earl and Fullan¶ 2003; Maxcy 2006). For instance, in her study on the impact of accountability reform¶ for four Chicago schools, Lipman notes how these ‘schools’ responses to accountability¶ are closely linked to past and present race and class advantages, the relative political¶ power of their communities, and new forms of racialization’ (2003, 338).¶ Moreover, in a significant minority of cases, high-stakes testing has led to curricular¶ content expansion, the integration of knowledge, and more student-centered, cooperative¶ pedagogies, such as in secondary social studies and language arts (Au 2007).¶ Hence, the nature of high-stakes-test-induced curricular control is highly dependent¶ on the structures of the tests themselves (Au 2007). In summary, **high-stakes testing¶ does not produce a monolithic effect, but has heterogeneous results depending on¶ questions of social difference and context**. Furthermore, **proponents of evidence-based¶ education ‘are not monolithic and that at least some of them are open to dialog on the¶ issues on which we disagree’** (Maxwell 2004, 39). In short, **an acknowledgment of the¶ colonial historical legacy of the evidence-based education movement may help us¶ move beyond a discourse of sameness in colonial discourse, and start thinking about¶ the possibilities, interruptions, contestations, and resistances to the colonizing effects¶ of evidence-based education**. Recently, there has been growing ethnographic studies¶ that examine such sites of resistance and contradictions at the ground level. These¶ spaces are where future studies and dialog could focus their attention. **In terms of policy and educational practice, an anticolonial lens motivates us to ask**¶ **a different set of questions and re-imagine educational research, practice, and policy.**¶ For instance, **what is being left out in the discussion of evidence-based education¶ movement is the glaring systemic inequities that are privileging some bodies**¶ (students, teachers, and administrators) **and knowledge systems (**language, curricula,¶ and culture) **over others** (see McNeil 2000; Lipman 2004; Valuenzela 2005; Maxcy¶ 2006), **that are tied to the global economy** (Stewart-Harawira 2005). Rather than blaming¶ students, teachers, and administrators for progress in public tests, and working¶ from a deficit model, **we need to shift our attention towards deploying significant¶ material and intellectual resources to** serve diverse needs and minoritized bodies¶ (Lipman 2002, 2003), and **challenge global economic systems**. Furthermore, **instead¶ of looking for the pitfalls of educational practice, we could ask** and explore the following¶ questions (see Asa Hilliard cited in Lemons-Smith 2008; Hood and Hopson 2008):¶ How does academic excellence flourish in schools attended mostly by minoritized¶ students? **How do teachers who reject the status quo and define excellence as responding¶ to community needs, find ways to promote excellence for all students regardless¶ of their circumstances**? ‘Student achievement at what cost’ [Michael Dantley, personal communication]? What ideological paradigms underlie teacher education?¶ What is the role of teacher preparation programs in perpetuating and promoting these¶ values of equity and social justice?¶ Finally, in terms of educational policy, we may ask: **whose cultural assumptions¶ and histories inform such accountability systems, ‘evidence,’ ‘data,’ and ‘learning¶ outcomes?’ ‘Whose notions of evidence matter most?** **And to whom does evidence¶ matter most?’** (Hood and Hopson 2008, 418). According to Stanfield (1999) and¶ Gillborn (2005), **educational policy and research continue to impose the standards and**¶ **products of White supremacy on the racially minoritized.** As Stanfield states:¶ **Implicit White supremacy norms and values contribute … to Eurocentric concepts and¶ measurement epistemologies, techniques, and interpretations** … Concretely, in the¶ United States and elsewhere in the West, … **it has been considered normative to consider¶ Eurocentric notions and experiences as the baseline, as the yardstick to compare and¶ contrast the notions and experiences of people of color**. This is … most apparent in¶ designing, implementing, and interpreting standardized tests and survey instruments.¶ (1999, 421)¶ I would argue that **we need to ‘reappropriate’ evidence-based education to include a¶ broader array of evidence, experiences, and cultural knowledges** (Luke 2003, 98; see¶ also Stanfield 1999; Valuenzela, Prieto, and Hamilton 2007). Finally, borrowing the¶ words of Asa Hilliard III, **we need to ask, ‘do we have the will to educate all children’**¶ (cited in Lemons-Smith 2008, 908), **to respond to the needs, survival, self-determination,¶ and sovereignty of their respective communities and the planet?** (see also Dei 2000;¶ Grande 2004). In an era of transnational capital, where ‘[g]lobalized discourses and agendasetting¶ and policy pressures now emerge from beyond the nation’(Rizvi and Lingard¶ 2010, 14–15), we need to have transnational dialogs (Mohanty 2003) on the impact of¶ evidence-based education and neoliberal reform across borders and social institutions.¶ This is because such transnational alliances and solidarity are needed to contest global¶ forces informed by transnational corporations as well as international organizations¶ such as the World Bank and OECD. What is noteworthy and rarely discussed, are the¶ similarities and differences in the discourses and effects of evidence-based education¶ movement across the three nation-states analyzed in this paper. Future research could¶ speculate and study how these ideas of evidence-based education circulate and move¶ across borders (see Rizvi and Lingard 2010).¶ Finally, as someone who has had the privilege to teach research methodology to¶ graduate students (including teachers, teacher educators, principals, and superintendents),¶ I am alarmed by how many of my students grumble about standardized testing,¶ and some even focus their research on such topics. What is also disconcerting is how¶ many of my students have a hard time imagining research and evidence that go¶ beyond numbers because of the ‘numbers game’ they must play in their daily working¶ lives. These trends are not a reflection of my students’ inabilities to see beyond¶ numbers, but a testament to the hegemony of the structural environment that reminds¶ them of what constitutes valid knowledge every day. Also of great concern is the¶ speed at which educational leaders, students, and teachers are being rushed through¶ standardized processes that leave little time for reflection, authenticity, and healing.¶ Many of my students have shared these accounts in my classroom, with me in person,¶ and in their reflection papers. For instance, one student who is currently a high school¶ teacher commented in a recent email: ‘The standards and objectives themselves work to eliminate any third space or anticolonial space. We read, write, process for the sole¶ purpose of testing and not for liberation.’¶ In this regard, I propose that we need to ‘slow down’ in educational practice and¶ policy. To this end, I am reminded of the words of Malidoma Some, an African Shaman¶ healer, who stated ‘while that the indigenous world looks, the industrial world over¶ looks’ (emphasis added). **Educators, teachers, students, and policy-makers need time,¶ not to be given more information for decision-making or learning, but more importantly¶ to assess what we are overlooking in educating future generations.** For instance, we¶ need more time to come together, dialog, heal, build reciprocity, understand difference,¶ and re-imagine educational policy and practice for the benefit of future generations. **It¶ is only by slowing down that we will realize that our students, educational researchers,¶ teachers, and administrators are not ‘uncultivated soil,’ in the words of La Casas, but¶ rather seeds with the power within to germinate on their own if they are provided the¶ freedom, resources, and time. Slowing down is what I believe decolonizing education¶ means in this era of neoliberal policies and transnational capital!**

# WTO

#### Nuke war won’t cause extinction—multiple warrants

J.R. Nyquist 99, WorldNetDaily contributing editor and author of ‘Origins of the Fourth World War,’ May 20, 1999, Antipas, “Is Nuclear War Survivable?” http://www.antipas.org/news/world/nuclear\_war.html

I patiently reply to these correspondents that nuclear war would not be the end of the world. I then point to **studies showing that “nuclear winter” has no scientific basis, that fallout from a nuclear war would not kill all life on earth. Surprisingly, few of my correspondents are convinced. They prefer apocalyptic myths created by pop scientists, movie producers and journalists. If Dr. Carl Sagan once said “nuclear winter” would follow a nuclear war, then it must be true. If radiation wipes out mankind in a movie, then that’s what we can expect in real life. But Carl** Sagan was wrong about nuclear winter**. And the movie “On the Beach” misled American filmgoers about the effects of fallout. It is time, once and for all, to lay these myths to rest. Nuclear war would not bring about the end of the world, though it would be horribly destructive. The truth is, many** prominent physicists have condemned the nuclear winter hypothesis. Nobel laureate **Freeman** Dyson **once** said **of nuclear winter research,** “It’s **an absolutely** atrocious **piece of** science**, but I quite despair of setting the public record straight.” Professor Michael** McElroy, a Harvard physics professor**, also criticized the nuclear winter hypothesis. McElroy** said **that nuclear winter** researchers “stacked the deck**” in their study, which was titled “Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions” (Science, December 1983). Nuclear winter is the theory that the mass use of nuclear weapons would create enough smoke and dust to blot out the sun, causing a catastrophic drop in global temperatures. According to Carl Sagan, in this situation the earth would freeze. No crops could be grown. Humanity would die of cold and starvation. In truth,** natural disasters **have** frequently produced smoke and dust far greater than **those** expected from **a** nuclear war. In 1883 Krakatoa exploded with a blast equivalent to 10,000 **one-megaton** bombs, **a detonation** greater than the combined nuclear arsenals of **planet** earth**. The** Krakatoa **explosion** had negligible weather effects. **Even more disastrous, going back many thousands of years,** a meteor struck Quebec with the force of 17.5 million one-megaton bombs, **creating a crater 63 kilometers in diameter.** But the world did not freeze. Life on earth was not extinguished**. Consider the views of Professor George Rathjens of MIT, a known antinuclear activist, who said, “**Nuclear winter is the worst example of misrepresentation of science to the public **in my memory.” Also consider Professor Russell Seitz, at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs, who says that the nuclear winter hypothesis has been discredited. Two researchers, Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider, debunked the nuclear winter hypothesis in the summer 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs. Thompson and Schneider stated: “**the global apocalyptic conclusions of the **initial** nuclear winter hypothesis can **now** be relegated to a **vanishingly** low level of probability.” **OK, so nuclear winter isn’t going to happen.** What about **nuclear** fallout? Wouldn’t **the** radiation **from a nuclear war contaminate the whole earth,** kill**ing** everyone? **The short answer is:** absolutely not**. Nuclear fallout is a problem, but we should not exaggerate its effects. As it happens, there are two types of fallout produced by nuclear detonations. These are: 1) delayed fallout; and 2) short-term fallout. According to researcher Peter V. Pry, “**Delayed fallout will not**, contrary to popular belief, gradually** kill billions **of people everywhere in the world.” Of course, delayed fallout would increase the number of people dying of lymphatic cancer, leukemia, and cancer of the thyroid. “However,” says Pry, “these** deaths would probably be far fewer than deaths now resulting from ... smoking, or from automobile accidents**.” The real hazard in a nuclear war is the short-term fallout. This is a type of fallout created when a nuclear weapon is detonated at ground level. This type of fallout could kill millions of people, depending on the targeting strategy of the attacking country. But** short-term fallout rapidly subsides to safe levels in 13 **to 18** days. It is not permanent**. People who live outside of the affected areas will be fine. Those in affected areas can survive if they have access to underground shelters. In some areas, staying indoors may even suffice. Contrary to popular misconception,** there were no **documented** deaths from **short-term or delayed** fallout at **either** Hiroshima or Nagasaki. These blasts **were low airbursts, which** produced minimal fallout **effects.** Today’s thermonuclearweapons are even “cleaner**.” If used in airburst mode,** these weapons would produce few (if any) fallout casualties**. On their side,** Russian military experts believe that the next world war will be a nuclear missile war. They know that nuclear weapons cannot cause the end of the world**. According to the Russian military writer, A. S. Milovidov, “**There is profound error and harm in the disoriented claims of bourgeois ideologues that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world war**.” Milovidov explains that** Western objections to the mass use of nuclear weapons are based on “a subjective judgment. It expresses mere protest against nuclear war**.” Another Russian theorist, Captain First Rank V. Kulakov, believes that a mass nuclear strike may not be enough to defeat “a strong enemy, with extensive territory enabling him to use space and time for the organizations of active and passive defense. ...”** Russian military theory regards nuclear war as highly destructive, but nonetheless winnable. Russian generals do not exaggerate the effects of mass destruction weapons. Although nuclear war would be unprecedented in its death-dealing potential, Russian strategists believe that a well-prepared system of tunnels and underground bunkers could save many millions of lives**. That is why Russia has built a comprehensive shelter system for its urban populace. On the American side as well, there have been studies which suggest that** nuclear war is survivable**. The famous 1960** Rand Corporation **study, “On Thermonuclear War,” says, “Even if 100 metropolitan areas [in the USA] are destroyed, there would be more wealth in this country than there is in all of Russia today and more skills than were available to that country in the forties. The United States is a very wealthy and well-educated country.” The Rand study** states that even if half the U.S. population were killed, “the survivors would not just lie down and die. Nor would they necessarily suffer a disastrous social disorganization.”

**Reject try or die logic at the heart of linear predictive scenarios—so called experts distort rational risk analysis by relying on high-magnitude impacts based on decontextualized internal-link chains.**

**Kessler ‘8** [Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” *Alternatives*  33 (2008), 211-232]

**If** the **risk** of terrorism **is defined**in traditional terms **by**probability and **potential loss, then the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of probabilities**. The reason is that **even the highest degree of improb- ability becomes irrelevant as**the measure of **loss goes to infinity**.^o The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution of "risk policies": **If one factor of the risk calculation approaches infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged),** then there is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and **risk manage- ment as a rational endeavor breaks down**. Under the historical con- dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely absent. The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter- rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management framed in line with logical probability theory, **the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty**. Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; **uncer- tainty is a** crucial **precondition for catastrophies.** In particular, cata- strophes happen at once, **without a warning**, but with major impli- cations for the world polity. In this category, **we find** the impact of **meteorites.** Mars attacks**, the tsunami in** South East **Asia, and 9/11.** To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap- pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that can be taken, but the **framing** of **terrorist attack as a catastrophe points to** spatial and temporal **characteristics** that are **beyond "ratio- nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre- empt an attack.** Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro- phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was responsible and whether it could have been prevented. This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur- ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex- ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur- rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties. Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob- lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that "most striking is the fact that **we do not** even **know** who or what will constitute **the most serious future threat,** "^i In order to cope with this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote, to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards" and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability- based defense planning strategy.53 The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that **even** the most **absurd scenarios** can **gain plausibility. By construct- ing a chain of potentialities, improbable events are linked and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable. "Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step, the** residual **impression is** one of **plausibility. "**54 This so-called Oth- ello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq. **The connection between Saddam** Hussein **and Al Qaeda** that the US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin- ning. False evidence **was** again and again **presented and refuted, but this did not prevent** the administration from presenting as the main rationale for war **the improbable yet possible connection** between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. **As** Donald Rumsfeld famously **said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."** This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer- tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.

#### This proves—Resource war Studies are flawed and economic scarcity is overstated.

Dan Deudney 99, Ass. Prof. of Political Sci. at Johns Hopkins, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics, Eds. Deudney & Matthews p 205-6

The hypothesis that states will begin fighting each other as natural resources are depleted and degraded seems intuitively accurate. The popular metaphor of a lifeboat adrift at sea with declining supplies of clean water and rations suggests there will be fewer opportunities for positive-sum gains between actors as resource scarcity grows. Many fears of resource war are derived from the cataclysmic world wars of the first half of the twentieth century Influenced by geopolitical theories that emphasized the importance of land and resources for great power status, Adolf Hitler fashioned Nazi German war aims to achieve resource autonomy. The aggression of Japan was directly related to resource goals: lacking indigenous fuel and minerals, and faced with a slowly tightening embargo by the Western colonial pow ers in Asia, the Japanese invaded Southeast Asia for oil, tin, and rub ber. Although the United States had a richer resource endowment than the Axis powers, fears of shortages and industrial strangulation played a central role in the strategic thinking of American elites about world strategy. During the Cold War, the presence of natural resources in the Third World helped turn this vast area into an arena for East-West conflict. Given this record, the scenario of conflicts over resources playing a powerful role in shaping international order should be taken seriously. However, there are three strong reasons for concluding that the familiar scenarios of resource war are of diminishing plausibility for the foreseeable future. First, the robust character of the world trade system means that states no longer experience resource dependency as a major threat to their military security and political autonomy. During the 1930s, the collapse of the world trading system drove states to pursue economic autarky, but the resource needs of contemporary states are routinely met without territorial control of the resource source. As Ronnie Lipschutz has argued, this means that re source constraints are much less likely to generate interstate violence than in the past. Second, the prospects for resource wars are diminished by the growing difficulty that states face in obtaining resources through territorial conquest. Although the invention of nuclear explosives has made it easy and cheap to annihilate humans and infrastructure in extensive areas, the spread of conventional weaponry and national consciousness has made it very costly for an invader, even one equipped with advanced technology, to subdue a resisting population, as France discovered in Indochina and Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. At the lower levels of violence capability that matter most for conquering and subduing territory; the great powers have lost effective military superiority and are unlikely soon to regain it. Third, nonrenewable resources are, contrary to intuitive logic, becoming less economically scarce. There is strong evidence that the world is entering what H. E. Goeller and Alvin M. Weinberg have labeled the “age of substitutability,” in which industrial technology is increasingly capable of fashioning ubiquitous and plentiful earth materials such as iron, aluminum, silicon, and hydrocarbons into virtually everything needed by modem societies. The most striking manifestation of this trend is that prices for virtually every raw material have been stagnant or falling for the last two decades despite the continued growth in world economic output. In contrast to the expectations widely held during the 1970s that resource scarcity would drive up commodity prices to the benefit of Third World raw material suppliers, prices have fallen

**The aff’s economic focus is indicative of a larger colonial objective to create “correct consumptions” – where the “savage” is “civilized” through the consumption of US goods**

**Domosh 2006** [Mona, Joan p. And edward j. Foley, jr 1933 department chair, professor of geography at Dartmouth, Ph.D., Clark University, “American Commodities in an Age of Empire” Published in 2006 by¶ Routledge¶ Taylor & Francis Group]

This social maintenance becomes particularly interesting when¶ we consider that part of what fueled late 19th century Western society¶ was its commitment to what Bederman calls a “Darwinist version of Protestant millennialism.”35 **The popularization of Darwin’s theories**¶ **of evolution in the latter part of the 19th century put a particular spin**¶ **on what had been a long-held belief in American Christian culture:**¶ **that human history had only one “cosmic purpose,” which was to**¶ **crusade against evil, and each successful battle brought humankind**¶ **closer to the millennium when Christ would rule over a righteous**¶ **world**. **Discourses of civilization provided a way of reconciling evolutionary**¶ **theory with this teleological belief in the movement of human**¶ **history toward some type of perfection:** instead of a deity working to¶ move humans toward perfection, evolution could do the trick. **Good**¶ **against evil was refigured as superior civilized races “outsurviving**”36¶ **inferior races.** And all good Christians had as their duty to work¶ toward this perfect society, a society of perfect “womanliness” and¶ “manliness.” As Bederman observes, “**this millennial vision of perfected**¶ **racial evolution and gender specialization was what people**¶ **meant when they referred to ‘the advancement of civilization.**’”37¶ **Civilizing savage “races” helped pave the road to this perfect society.**¶ **And because women were viewed as integral to this civilizing process,**¶ **it was of the utmost importance that their feminine roles be maintained**.¶ **If civilization itself was defined by adherence to appropriate**¶ **gender roles, civilized societies had to be populated by manly men**¶ **and womanly women,** and part of what defined a womanly woman¶ was her role as a civilizer and domesticator of society.¶ **Although this discourse of civilization/savagery has deep roots**¶ **within Judeo-Christian culture and a complex history, its particular**¶ **formulation in the late 19th century was intricately connected to**¶ **commodity capitalism**.38 **Western products were seen as active agents**¶ **in the “civilizing” process and proof that one had achieved the stage**¶ **of “civilization.**” **Correct consumption**, then, **was not simply a social**¶ **necessity but was a national imperative**. **For those living distant from**¶ **the core areas of American power, and for those new to the United**¶ **States, purchasing American products became akin to participating**¶ **in American “civilization.”** “**Consumption**,” in the words of Stuart¶ Ewen, “**assumed an ideological veil of nationalism and democratic**¶ **lingo.”**39 And American **companies**, particularly those that were international,¶ **were quick to adopt and adapt this “ideological veil” to fit**¶ **their advertising needs**, using **their international experiences to align**¶ **their products with civilizing experience and using the discourse of**¶ **civilization to legitimize their international sales**. This book, therefore,¶ focuses on how the discourse of civilization — this complex,¶ often contradictory, and powerful set of ideas — both supported and¶ was itself strengthened by the visual and verbal languages used to¶ market American products overseas and at home.40 Yet, before I turn to my in-depth analyses of these corporate “civilizing” stories, I set¶ the stage, as it were, by outlining their material bases — the spatial¶ expanse and sociospatial processes that constituted an American¶ commercial empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

**The WTO has sidelined those it promised to help and actually made situations worse in non-Western countries**

**Guardian 11** (Aurielle Walker, Staff writer for The Guardian, “The WTO has failed developing nations” 14 November 2011 http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/14/wto-fails-developing-countries)

But the **WTO membership** has **failed to deliver** the promised pro-development **changes**. Finding "development" in the Doha Development Round today is like looking for a needle in a haystack. **Developing countries have been completely sidelined by the economic and political interests of global powers**.¶ ¶ Here are 10 examples of how the WTO has failed the poor:¶ ¶ 1. Cotton: the Fairtrade Foundation revealed last year how the $47bn in subsidies paid to rich-country producers in the past 10 years has created barriers for the 15 million cotton farmers across west Africa trying to trade their way out of poverty, and how **5 million of the world's poorest farming families have been forced out of business and into deeper poverty because of** those **subsidies**.¶ ¶ 2. Agricultural subsidies: beyond cotton, **WTO** members have **failed** even to agree how **to reduce** the huge **subsidies** paid **to rich world farmers, who**se overproduction continues to **threaten** the livelihoods of **developing world farmers.**¶ ¶ 3. Trade agreements: the **WTO** has also **failed to clarify** the deliberately ambiguous rules on concluding **trade agreements** that allow the poorest countries to be manipulated by the rich states. In Africa, in negotiations with the EU, countries have been forced to eliminate tariffs on up to 90% of their trade because no clear rules exist to protect them.¶ ¶ 4. Special treatment: the rules for developing countries, called "special and differential treatment" rules, were meant to be reviewed to make them more precise, effective and operational. But the WTO has failed to work through the 88 proposals that would fill the legal vacuum.¶ ¶ 5. Medicine: the poorest in developing countries are unable to access affordable medicine because members have failed to clarify ambiguities between the need for governments to protect public health on one hand and on the other to protect the intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical companies.¶ ¶ 6. Legal costs: the **WTO pledged to improve access to its** expensive and complex **legal system, but has failed**. In 15 years of dispute settlement under the WTO, 400 cases have been initiated. **No African country has acted as a complainant and only one least developed country has ever filed a claim**.¶ ¶ 7. Protectionist economic policies: one of the WTO's five core functions agreed at its inception in 1995 was to achieve more coherence in global economic policy-making. Yet the **WTO failed to curb the speedy increase in the number of protectionist measures** applied by G20 countries in response to the global economic crisis over the past two years – despite G20 leaders' repeated affirmations of their "unwavering" commitment to resist all forms of protectionist measures.¶ ¶ 8. Natural disaster: **the WTO fails to alleviate suffering when it has the opportunity to do so**. In the case of natural disaster, the membership will have taken almost two years to agree and implement temporary trade concessions for Pakistan, where severe flooding displaced 20 million people in 2010 and caused $10bn of damage. Those measures, according to the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, would have boosted Pakistan's exports to the EU by at least €100m this year.¶ ¶ 9. Decision-making**: the WTO makes most of its decisions by consensus – and achieving consensus between 153 countries is nearly impossible**. But this shows another failure of the WTO: to break the link between market size and political weight that would give small and poor countries a voice in the trade negotiations.¶ ¶ 10. Fair trade: 10 years after the start of the Doha Development Round, **governments have failed to make trade fair**. As long as small and poor countries remain without a voice, the role of campaigning organisations, such as Traidcraft and Fairtrade Foundation, which are working together to eliminate cotton subsidies, will remain critical.¶ ¶ **The WTO has failed to live up to its promises over the past decade, which reveals a wider systemic problem in the global community. True and lasting solutions to global economic problems can only come when the model of global competitiveness between countries becomes one of genuine cooperation**.

**Their concern for Latin American help is disingenuous – political stability is a tool to mask economic interests in the region that further American intervention and imperialism.**

**Slater, 2004** [David Slater, Emeritus Professor of Political Geography, & Associate Fellow of the Institute for the Study of the Americas at the University of London, *Geopolitics and the Postcolonial: Rethinking North-South Relations*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd]

**Roosevelt’s ‘good neighbour’ approach to Latin America** – which, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, found echoes in the Alliance for Progress of 1961 and President Clinton’s view of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 – **gave priority to mutually beneficial relations between the northern and southern parts of the Americas in a context of free trade and political cooperation. Not only were the economic ties that bind being drawn closer between the north and south of the Americas,** as reflected in trade and investment patterns, but also **these ties were another part of the US ‘mission’ to export its way of life** (O’Brien 1996: 251). **The ‘good neighbour’ policy was a significant attempt to provide a sense of political, economic, moral and cultural leadership for the Americas. It aimed at outlining the guidance and direction that was deemed necessary for Inter-American relations** in turbulent times. **It highlighted the importance of persuasion, of mutual understanding, responsibilities and respect, of a joint project of progress and friendship** across the Americas, through which all the peoples of the ‘American Family of Nations’ would benefit and prosper. **It underscored the key role of free trade**, a point which Roosevelt repeated in a speech to the Inter- American Conference in Buenos Aires in 1936. Free trade and commerce were also intimately linked to a Wilsonian stress on democracy. Further, in the ‘Good Neighbour’ address as well as in other speeches given in the 1930s, **Roosevelt returned to the importance of the ‘spiritual solidarity’ and ‘spiritual unity’ of the Americas,** which he saw as an integral part of faith in God, and faith and spirit were invoked as being crucial to the ‘Western Hemisphere’ and the ‘Western World’. **Statements on trade and commerce, democracy, religion and a spirit of mutual obligation, respect and understanding formed the key components of the Rooseveltian perspective.** His vision was also associated with a new style, **the US President being presented as a ‘friendly uncle’ figure offering a ‘new deal’ for the Latin American nations.** In general, **Roosevelt’s intervention was an attempt to build a hegemonic discourse for the Americas,** a way of bringing together the ‘family of American nations’ into a US-led project which expressed a multi-dimensional power. **It was an attempt to nurture Latin American consent for the leadership role of the United States**, and at the same time **it was also a response to the development of Latin American nationalism and anti-imperialist sentiment.** In practice, however, although ‘gunboat diplomacy’ faded from view, and concrete steps were taken to end the era of protectorates (as exemplified in the Cuban case with the abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1934), dictatorships in countries such as the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua were still supported (Black 1988). As a consequence and by the end of the 1930s, **with US support for the strengthening of the armed forces in Latin America, Latin American opinion became much more critical of the ‘good neighbour’ notion**, so that at the end of the 1930s **a populist Peruvian leader, Haya de la Torre, could refer to the Roosevelt Administration as ‘the good neighbor of tyrants’** (Rosenberg 1982: 227).

**The WTO kills people and exacerbates hunger, poverty, and disease by trampling on smaller underdeveloped countries**

**Global Exchange 13** (no author, Global Exchange - international human rights organization dedicated to promoting social, economic and environmental justice around the world “Top Reasons to Oppose the WTO” http://www.globalexchange.org/resources/wto/oppose)

6**. The WTO is Killing People**¶ **The WTO’s** fierce **defense of ‘Trade Related Intellectual Property’** rights (TRIPs)—patents, copyrights and trademarks—**comes at the expense of health and human lives**. The **WTO has protected for pharmaceutical companies**’ ‘right to profit’ **against governments seeking to protect their people’s health** **by providing lifesaving medicines** in countries in areas like sub-saharan Africa, **where thousands die every day from HIV/AIDS.** Developing countries won an important victory in 2001 when they affirmed the right to produce generic drugs (or import them if they lacked production capacity), so that they could provide essential lifesaving medicines to their populations less expensively. Unfortunately, in September 2003, many new conditions were agreed to that will make it more difficult for countries to produce those drugs. Once again, **the WTO** demonstrates that it **favors corporate profit over saving human lives**.¶ 7. **The WTO is Increasing Inequality**¶ Free trade is not working for the majority of the world. **During the most recent period of rapid growth** in global trade and investment (1960 to 1998**) inequality worsened both internationally and within countries.** The UN Development Program reports that the richest 20 percent of the world’s population consume 86 percent of the world’s resources while **the poorest 80 percent consume just 14 percent.** **WTO** **rules have hastened these trends by** opening up countries to foreign investment and thereby **making it easier for production to go where the labor is cheapest and most easily exploited and environmental costs are low**.¶ 8. The WTO is Increasing Hunger**¶ Farmers produce enough food in the world to feed everyone – yet because of corporate control** of food distribution, as many as **800 million people worldwide suffer from chronic malnutrition**. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, food is a human right. In developing countries, as many as four out of every five people make their living from the land. But the leading principle in the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture is that market forces should control agricultural policies-rather than a national commitment to guarantee food security and maintain decent family farmer incomes. WTO policies have allowed dumping of heavily subsidized industrially produced food into poor countries, undermining local production and increasing hunger.¶ 9. **The WTO Hurts Poor, Small Countries in Favor of Rich Powerful Nations**¶ The WTO supposedly operates on a consensus basis, with equal decision-making power for all. In reality, many important decisions get made in a process whereby **poor countries’ negotiators are not even invited to closed door meeting**s – and then ‘agreements’ are announced that poor countries didn’t even know were being discussed. Many countries do not even have enough trade personnel to participate in all the negotiations or to even have a permanent representative at the WTO. This severely disadvantages poor countries from representing their interests. Likewise, **many countries are too poor to defend themselves from WTO challenges from the rich countries, and change their laws rather than pay for their own defense**.¶ 10. The WTO Undermines Local Level Decision-Making and National Sovereignty¶ The WTO’s “most favored nation” provision requires all WTO member countries to treat each other equally and to treat all corporations from these countries equally regardless of their track record. Local policies aimed at rewarding companies who hire local residents, use domestic materials, or adopt environmentally sound practices are essentially illegal under the WTO. Developing countries are prohibited from creating local laws that developed countries once pursued, such as protecting new, domestic industries until they can be internationally competitive. California Governor Gray Davis vetoed a “Buy California” bill that would have granted a small preference to local businesses because it was WTO-illegal. Conforming with the WTO required entire sections of US laws to be rewritten**. Many countries are even changing their laws and constitutions in anticipation of potential future WTO rulings and negotiations**.

# IP

**IPR Treaties hurt developing countries**

**US News** 9/22/**10** (Developing Countries May Not Benefit From Adopting International Treaties, US News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/science/articles/2010/09/22/developing-countries-may-not-benefit-from-adopting-international-treaties)

A new study by an Oregon State University business professor has found that **developing countries that adopt major international economic treaties do not** necessarily **gain more foreign direct investment.¶ In fact**, in some cases **adopting these treaties can hurt**, not help **a developing country, contrary to what agencies such as the** World Trade Organization **(WTO) espouse**. The study, published in the online version of the Journal of World Business, has major implications for Latin American and Caribbean intellectual policy reform.¶ Ted Khoury, an assistant professor in OSU’s College of Business, spent more than 12 years in private industry managing intellectual property and research and development strategies at various firms. He is the inventor of 43 issued United States patents and more than 70 international patents in areas related to micro/nanotechnology and semiconductor manufacturing.¶ Khoury wanted to know when developing countries in Latin America adopt intellectual property treaties such as the Paris Convention if their inbound investment from foreign countries increases. Mike Peng from the University of Texas at Dallas contributed to the research.¶ “Basically, I wanted to know when developing countries take on the rules of the wealthy, developed nations, do good things happen to them?” Khoury said. “And in many cases, the answer is no.”¶ Khoury looked specifically at the Paris Convention treaty, which was renewed in 1967. He found that **countries that did not have a significant invention and scientific research base did not financially benefit from adopting the treaty, and in some cases found their economic situations worsen.**¶ The OSU professor pointed out that developed countries such as the United States encourage others to adopt the treaties because they want to be able to file their patents in countries where there may be a market for their product, or perhaps where there may be a manufacturing workforce to make the product.¶ As the inventor of more than 100 domestic and international patents, Khoury saw this issue come up frequently when he was filing for patents in other countries. Companies file international patents to protect their invention and make sure competitors in other countries do not copy the product; and they want to ensure that they can sell, market or manufacture the product overseas.¶ Looking at the data over a 14-year period in 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries, Khoury found that countries that adopted the Paris Convention early—such as Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay—had an inflow of foreign direct investment if they increased innovation, which he measured by the number of scholarly journals published and number of patents filed from that country. So in some cases, adoption of international intellectual property rights treaties may have helped a developing nation.¶ But **in countries with the lowest innovation base—including El Salvador, Honduras and Paraguay—early adoption did not increase investment** in those countries.¶ “**Countries that do not adopt are threatened with sanctions and other types of coercion**,” Khoury said. “**This explains why so many developing nations adopt treaties that are, quite frankly, not beneficial to them and in some cases only helps larger, multinational corporations within more industrialized countries**.”¶ Khoury explained that developing countries often struggle to stay in harmony with international treaties that are designed as “one-size-fits-all.” In many cases, he added, developing nations may see much larger economic benefits from delaying participating with economic treaties such as the Paris Convention and waiting until they have increased their domestic innovation base.

**International law is a eurocentric notion used to objectify and make dispensible non-european subjects**

**Mignolo 09**(Walter D. Dispensible and Bare Lives. Coloniality and the Hidden Political/Economic Agenda of Modernity. HUMAN ARCHITECTURE: JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE, VII, 2, SPRING 2009, 69-88. Duke University. )

**International Law is an integral part of**¶ **coloniality: it legalizes the rhetoric of modernity while simultaneously enforcing the**¶ **logic of coloniality**. **It was prompted by the**¶ **“discovery” of unknown lands and unknown people; and by trafﬁc of enslaved**¶ **Africans to the New World. I**n 1979, U.O.¶ Umozurike, from the University of Nigeria,¶ published a report on International Law and¶ Colonialism in Africa. The book was published by Nwamife Publisher Limited, in¶ Enugu, Nigeria. Given the book-market¶ and the trade-names of European and US¶ scholars and intellectual, the book did not¶ get much attention, beyond a numerical¶ minority interested in the topic. In the¶ 1990s Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, an African¶ political theorist based at John Hopkins¶ University, **followed up on the issue re viewing international law in the modern/**¶ **colonial world from the histories of colonial**¶ Africa and the colonial experience of Africans. For the purpose at hand, here is **a**¶ **lengthy paragraph that would help us in**¶ **unveiling the interconnections between international law, dispensable and bare lives:** ¶ **As a constituent element of Western culture, the law of nations has**¶ **been integral to a discourse of inclusion and exclusion.** In this regard, **international law has formed**¶ **its subject and objects through an**¶ **arbitrary system of signs**. As rhetoric of identity, it **has depended**¶ **upon metaphysical associations**¶ **grounded on religious, cultural, or**¶ **racial similarities and differences.**¶ **The legal subject, for the most part,**¶ **has been composed of a Christian/**¶ **European self. In contrast, the European founders of the law of nations created an opposite image of**¶ **the self (the other) as a legal object.**¶ **They materialized this legal objectiﬁcation of non-Europeans**¶ **through a process of alterity.** **The**¶ **other has comprised, at once, nonEuropean communities that Europe has accepted as its mirror image and those it has considered to**¶ **be either languishing in a developmental stage long since surpassed**¶ **by Europe or moving in historical**¶ **progression toward the model provided by the European self** (Grovogui, 1996, 65). ¶ **The** **simultaneous epistemic process of**¶ **inclusion/exclusion, led ﬁrst by Christian**¶ **theology, later on by philosophy and science, and lately by political economy supported by political theory**, **of which**¶ **international law was and continues to be a**¶ **key instrument, is at the historical foundation of the modern/colonial world, of modernity/coloniality and of imperial**¶ **capitalism**. Francisco de Vitoria in Salamanca, Spain, in the mid sixteenth century;¶ Hugo Grotius in the Netherland at the beginning of the seventeenth century; and¶ Seraphin de Freitas, in Portugal, critically¶ responding to Hugo Grotious, constitute¶ three pillars of International Law in the historical foundation of the modern/colonial¶ world. **Subjects whose subjectivities and**¶ **sensibilities have not been formed by** the¶ **European memories** of Greece and Rome,¶ of Greek and Latin, **and** by its modern imperial **languages** (Italian, Portuguese,¶ Spanish, French, German and English), **began to be constructed, in the European discourse of international law, as legal objects.**¶ **“Legal objects” have been stripped of their**¶ **language, religions, families, communities,**¶ **sensibilities, memories—in sum, legal objects became, for European international**¶ **law, not only bare but above all dispensable**¶ **lives. If non-European people were and are**¶ **targets of commodiﬁcation of human lives,**¶ **they are also targets to be outlawed. As legal objects, non-European subjects had no**¶ **say in International Law, unless they**¶ **agreed with the terms stipulated by European law-makers**

#### Their food scenarios don’t assume market adjustment

Dan Deudney 99, Ass. Prof. of Political Sci. at Johns Hopkins, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics, Eds. Deudney & Matthews p 205-6

The hypothesis that states will begin fighting each other as natural resources are depleted and degraded seems intuitively accurate. The popular metaphor of a lifeboat adrift at sea with declining supplies of clean water and rations suggests there will be fewer opportunities for positive-sum gains between actors as resource scarcity grows. Many fears of resource war are derived from the cataclysmic world wars of the first half of the twentieth century Influenced by geopolitical theories that emphasized the importance of land and resources for great power status, Adolf Hitler fashioned Nazi German war aims to achieve resource autonomy. The aggression of Japan was directly related to resource goals: lacking indigenous fuel and minerals, and faced with a slowly tightening embargo by the Western colonial pow ers in Asia, the Japanese invaded Southeast Asia for oil, tin, and rub ber. Although the United States had a richer resource endowment than the Axis powers, fears of shortages and industrial strangulation played a central role in the strategic thinking of American elites about world strategy. During the Cold War, the presence of natural resources in the Third World helped turn this vast area into an arena for East-West conflict. Given this record, the scenario of conflicts over resources playing a powerful role in shaping international order should be taken seriously. However, there are three strong reasons for concluding that the familiar scenarios of resource war are of diminishing plausibility for the foreseeable future. First, the robust character of the world trade system means that states no longer experience resource dependency as a major threat to their military security and political autonomy. During the 1930s, the collapse of the world trading system drove states to pursue economic autarky, but the resource needs of contemporary states are routinely met without territorial control of the resource source. As Ronnie Lipschutz has argued, this means that re source constraints are much less likely to generate interstate violence than in the past. Second, the prospects for resource wars are diminished by the growing difficulty that states face in obtaining resources through territorial conquest. Although the invention of nuclear explosives has made it easy and cheap to annihilate humans and infrastructure in extensive areas, the spread of conventional weaponry and national consciousness has made it very costly for an invader, even one equipped with advanced technology, to subdue a resisting population, as France discovered in Indochina and Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. At the lower levels of violence capability that matter most for conquering and subduing territory; the great powers have lost effective military superiority and are unlikely soon to regain it. Third, nonrenewable resources are, contrary to intuitive logic, becoming less economically scarce. There is strong evidence that the world is entering what H. E. Goeller and Alvin M. Weinberg have labeled the “age of substitutability,” in which industrial technology is increasingly capable of fashioning ubiquitous and plentiful earth materials such as iron, aluminum, silicon, and hydrocarbons into virtually everything needed by modem societies. The most striking manifestation of this trend is that prices for virtually every raw material have been stagnant or falling for the last two decades despite the continued growth in world economic output. In contrast to the expectations widely held during the 1970s that resource scarcity would drive up commodity prices to the benefit of Third World raw material suppliers, prices have fallen

#### The medicine doesn’t go globall—the fact that large pharmaceutical businesses control things like insulin productions means they can just jack up prices

**Angell 11**, Marcia, writer of The Truth about the Drug Companies, The Truth About Big Pharma : Exposing The Evils of Drug Companies, http://shimla.hubpages.com/hub/Drug-Companies-and-their-Evil-Ways)//AG

Marcia Angell MD, in her book, The Truth about the Drug Companies, writes, “The combined profits for the top ten drug companies in the Fortune 500 ($35.9 billion) were more than the profits for all the other 490 businesses put together ($33.7 billion). Over the past two decades the pharmaceutical industry has moved very far from its original high purpose of discovering and producing useful new drugs. Now primarily a marketing machine to sell drugs of dubious benefit, the industry uses its wealth and power to co-opt every institution that might stand in its way, including the US Congress, the FDA, academic medical centers, and the medical profession itself.”¶ Facts About Drug Companies¶ On a daily basis Americans are hit with a barrage of ads from the drug companies promoting a message that ‘yes these drugs are expensive, but they are essential to your well-being and our research and development costs are huge – you get what you pay for’. We are being fed a big serve of BS!¶ Now I am not refuting that the pharmaceutical industry hasn’t helped to produce and provide effective drugs that have saved, improved and extended millions of lives, but their criminal and deceitful practices have caused a lot of grief, pain, unnecessary financial strain and deaths as well.¶ Some facts about the industry and the people they ‘serve’:¶ Americans spend over $200 billion on prescriptions drugs with a growth of 12% annually.¶ The rising cost of drugs means that many Americans simply can’t afford them or take less than the prescribed dose and are too embarrassed to tell their treating doctor, therebye making an accurate assessment impossible.¶ The elderly are the most vulnerable – without supplementary insurance, and an average cost of $1500 a year for each drug they take, the costs are an impossible burden for many seniors.¶ Despite the drug industry’s claims, research and development accounts for a relatively small part of their costs, especially when compared with marketing and administration, which soaks up about 36% of sales revenue – 250% more than R&D.

#### Disease are short term – They evolve to be benign.

AMNH 98 The American Museum of Natural History “How did Hyperdisease cause extinctions?” http://www.amnh.org/science/biodiversity/extinction/Day1/disease/Bit2.html

It is well known that lethal diseases can have a profound effect on species' population size and structure. However, it is generally accepted that the principal populational effects of disease are acute--that is, short-term. In other words, although a species many suffer substantial loss from the effects of a given highly infectious disease at a given time, the facts indicate that natural populations tend to bounce back after the period of high losses. Thus, disease as a primary cause of extinction seems implausible. However, this is the normal case, where the disease-provoking pathogen and its host have had a long relationship. Ordinarily, it is not in the pathogens interest to rapidly kill off large numbers of individuals in its host species, because that might imperil its own survival. Disease theorists long ago expressed the idea that pathogens tend to evolve toward a "benign" state of affairs with their hosts, which means in practice that they continue to infect, but tend not to kill (or at least not rapidly). A very good reason for suspecting this to be an accurate view of pathogen-host relationships is that individuals with few or no genetic defenses against a particular pathogen will be maintained within the host population, thus ensuring the pathogen's ultimate survival.

#### 2. No terminal impact – Too fast or too slow.

The Independent 03 “Future Tense: Is Mankind Doomed?” http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0725-04.htm

Maybe - though plenty of experienced graduate students could already have a stab. But nature knows that infectious diseases are very hard to get right. Only HIV/Aids has 100 per cent mortality, and takes a long time to achieve it. By definition, lethal diseases kill their host. If they kill too quickly, they aren't passed on; if too slowly, we can detect them and isolate the infected. Any mutant smallpox or other handmade germ would certainly be too deadly or too mild. And even SARS killed fewer people worldwide than die on Britain's roads in a week. As scares go, this one is ideal - overblown and unrealistic.

#### 3. No risk of big impact – Quarantines check.

Pharma Investments, Ventures & Law Weekly 05 “SARS; Quarantine is cost saving and effective in containing emerging infections” Lexis

Quarantine is cost saving and effective in containing emerging infections. "Over time, quarantine has become a classic public health intervention and has been used repeatedly when newly emerging infectious diseases have threatened to spread throughout a population. "Here, we weigh the economic costs and benefits associated with implementing widespread quarantine in Toronto during the SARS outbreaks of 2003," scientists writing in the Journal of Infection report. "We compared the costs of two outbreak scenarios: in Scenario A, SARS is able to transmit itself throughout a population without any significant public health interventions. In Scenario B, quarantine is implemented early on in an attempt to contain the virus. "By evaluating these situations, we can investigate whether or not the use of quarantine is justified by being either cost-saving, life saving, or both," wrote A.G. Gupta and colleagues at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. "Our results indicate that quarantine is effective in containing newly emerging infectious diseases, and also cost saving when compared to not implementing a widespread containment mechanism," the authors said. Gupta concluded, "This paper illustrates that it is not only in our humanitarian interest for public health and healthcare officials to remain aggressive in their response to newly emerging infections, but also in our collective economic interest. Despite somewhat daunting initial costs, quarantine saves both lives and money." Gupta and colleagues published their study in the Journal of Infection (The economic impact of quarantine: SARS in Toronto as a case study. J Infect, 2005;50(5):386-393).

# 2NC

**2. That’s symbolic of their colonial biases—the West only acts when they are threatened but ignore the infinite suffering of the oppressed because they don’t factor into rational policy calculus**

**3. You should privilege the slow violence of every-day repression**

**Klein 3** [Naomi, award-winning journalist and syndicated columnist and the author of the international and New York Times bestseller The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, “Free Trade Is War”, The Nation, 9-11, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20030929/klein]

**After September 11**, right-wing pundits couldn't bury the globalization movement fast enough. We were gleefully informed that in times of war, no one would care about frivolous issues like water privatization. **Much of the US antiwar movement fell into a related trap: Now was not the time to focus on divisive economic debates, it was time to come together to call for peace.** All this nonsense ends in Cancún this week, when thousands of activists converge to declare that the brutal economic model advanced by the World Trade Organization is itself a form of war. War because privatization and deregulation kill--by pushing up prices on necessities like water and medicines and pushing down prices on raw commodities like coffee, making small farms unsustainable. War because those who resist and "refuse to disappear," as the Zapatistas say, are routinely arrested, beaten and even killed. War because **when** this kind of **low-intensity repression fails to clear the path to corporate liberation, the real wars begin**. The global antiwar protests that surprised the world on February 15 grew out of the networks built by years of globalization activism, from Indymedia to the World Social Forum. And despite attempts to keep the movements separate, their only future lies in the convergence represented by Cancún. **Past movements have tried to fight wars without confronting the economic interests behind them**, or to win economic justice without confronting military power. Today's activists, already experts at following the money, aren't making the same mistake. Take Rachel Corrie. Although she is engraved in our minds as the 23-year-old in an orange jacket with the courage to face down Israeli bulldozers, Corrie had already glimpsed a larger threat looming behind the military hardware. "I think **it is counterproductive to only draw attention to crisis points--the** demolition of houses, shootings, **overt violence**," she wrote in one of her last e-mails. "**So much of what happens** in Rafah **is related to this slow elimination of people's ability to survive**.... Water, in particular, seems critical and invisible." The 1999 Battle of Seattle was Corrie's first big protest. When she arrived in Gaza, she had already trained herself not only to see the repression on the surface but to dig deeper, to search for the economic interests served by the Israeli attacks. This digging--interrupted by her murder--led Corrie to the wells in nearby settlements, which she suspected of diverting precious water from Gaza to Israeli agricultural land.

**7. We must decolonize education by centering minority epistemologies**

**Richardson 12** (Troy A, Associate Professor, College of Agriculture and Life Sciences (CALS), Cornell University, "Disrupting the Coloniality of Being: Toward De-colonial Ontologies in Philosophy of Education." Studies in Philosophy and Education 31.6 (2012): 539-551)OG

Countering hierarchical social and educational relations in contexts of racialization is¶ outlined by Margonis (1999, 2000, 2011a, b) as an ontological project and philosophers of¶ education invested in a critical analysis of the intersections of race, class and colonialism¶ are indebted to his thinking. I think it is important to read Margonis as **fostering a**¶ **de-colonial position in** philosophy of **education** **and** his call for **a dialogical pedagogical**¶ **practice is crucially important for shifting the location of philosophical knowledge generation and the languages of education.** Indeed, Margonis’ dialogical (2007, 2011a, b)¶ project for anti-assimilatory education would suggests multilingualism to assist in moving¶ from the hegemonic languages of philosophy (German, French and English) to Indigenous¶ languages, African-American Vernacular English, creole and Chicano Spanish. Accordingly, his call for dialogue is in direct conversation with Mignolo (2000) and MaldonadoTorres (2004, 2009). For each of these thinkers, coming into and becoming through a¶ dialogical relation re-situates being by exposing and disrupting the colonialist claims that¶ Indigenous and African and African diaspora peoples were or are primitive. Likewise,¶ **dialogue resituates being by placing minoritized knowledge systems and forms of being at**¶ **the center of relationships of learning.**¶Dialogue and multilingualism in the service of more expansive discussions of being¶ cannot then be grounded in a pre-formulated or normalized (continental) existentialist¶ language of philosophy. Rather, **dialogue can be outlined according to a de-colonial**¶ **attitude** (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 262) **which takes as its primary effort the assertion of**¶ the languages which relate those **knowledge systems and forms of being that have been**¶ **conceived as outside or below the domain of Being.** Dialogue conceived with a decolonial¶ attitude would necessitate bi- or multilingualism to undermine the ways in which the term¶ ‘‘enigma’’ is used to dismiss and denigrate minoritized knowledges and forms of life. As I¶ will elaborate below, multilingualism should be rethought according to languaging¶ (Mignolo 2000). Following the work of Khatibi (1999) and Anzaldua (1987) Mignolo has¶ used the terms languaging and bilanguaging to signal a shift away from a strictly technical¶ project for linguistic communication or translation (see also Sandoval 2000). For each of¶ these thinkers, bilanguaging operates to re-position being according to the ways of life of¶ the minoritized. In this way, African Americans, Latina/os and Native Americans are not¶ enigmas for philosophers of education but opportunities and invitations for a formulation¶ of being that is non-assimilationist to the privileged and hegemonic languages of¶ philosophy.¶ Dialogue and the Decolonial Attitude¶ Maldonado-Torres (2007) speaks of a Du Bois (1999) inspired de-colonial attitude that¶ ‘‘demands responsibility and the willingness to take many perspectives and [the] points of¶ view of those whose very existence is questioned and produced as insigniﬁcant’’ (262).¶ While dialogue is not explicitly named here, it is an assumed element in developing the¶ decolonial attitude. Indeed, elsewhere Maldonado-Torres (2004) elaborates how **‘‘radical**¶ **critique should take dialogical form’’ whereby philosophers ‘‘make space for the**¶ **enunciation of non-Western cosmologies and for the expression of different cultural,**¶ **political and social memories’**’ (51). Du Bois (1999) is for Maldonado-Torres (2007) one¶ who made spaces for the memories of African and African diaspora peoples through a¶ radical form of dialogue. From this dialogue a different direction for the articulation and¶ formulation of African American forms of being was charted.¶ Moreover, as Maldonado-Torres (2007) goes on to note, Du Bois’ dialogue enabled ‘‘the¶ creation of black institutions in the United States as well as furthering Pan-African visions¶ and struggles’’ (262). Du Bois fostered and called forth spaces for Pan-African visions,¶ providing a ‘‘fundamental shift in perspective that leads one to see the world anew in a way¶ that targets its evil in a new way and gives us a better sense of what to do next’’¶ (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 262). On Maldonado-Torres’ (2004, 2007) reading, the institution building Du Bois achieved was a realization of a radicalized form of dialogue where¶ the knowledges, terms and forms of being expressed by African and African diaspora¶ peoples provide the intellectual, philosophical and ontological force for these projects.¶ There is in Maldonado-Torres’s description here an important complementarity to¶ Margonis’ (2011a, b) notion of being in dialogue with the sentiments and existential¶ situations of racialized/colonized peoples. Indeed, Margonis (2011a, b) echoes some of this¶ Du Boisian de-colonial attitude when he writes ‘‘educators would do well to invite broad¶ and cacophonous forms of interaction in the classroom; a mix of conservative, artistic,¶ comedic, and narrative patterns in the classroom gives a broader range of points of contact¶ with students’’ (3). Margonis arrives at this call for a cacophonous classroom in large part¶ through his careful reading and reworking of Freire’s (1993) notion of dialogue. ‘‘Freire’s¶ description of egalitarian, de-colonizing dialogue,’’ he writes, provide ‘‘means for setting¶ in motion social spaces of focused, passionate intellectual intensity’’ (Margonis 2011a, b,¶ 3). Like Maldonado-Torres (2004, 2007) the insistence here on dialogue as crucial to¶ providing the space for engagements with multiple intellectual traditions is crucial for¶ Margonis. As I have suggested above however, this space for dialogue has not prompted a¶ stance which works to expose the coloniality of being operating in Rousseau (1984) or¶ Heidegger (1962). Again, Margonis (2007, 2011a, b) seems to limit a more radical¶ understanding of dialogue provokes an anti-assimilationist stance toward Rousseau’s¶ (1984) and Heidegger’s (1962) philosophies of being. In this way, Margonis (1999, 2009)¶ inadvertently de-couples a particular existentialist philosophical discourse from its relationship to colonialism.¶ In stating this, I am not suggesting that Margonis, I or Maldonado-Torres (2007, 2009)¶ could easily ‘‘ﬁx’’ the discourse of primitive in Heidegger for example (1962) as a way to¶ deploy him otherwise. As Bernasconi (2005) has warned, we cannot simply enact a¶ ‘‘surgical [philosophical] operation’’ (243) to smooth over these tensions for a more¶ ‘‘inclusive’’ Heideggerian existentialism. A de-colonial dialogue can be more attentive to¶ shifts toward bilanguaging in the enunciations and learning of Indigenous, African and¶ African diaspora and Latino/a traditions of being.¶ Bilanguaging and/as Border Thinking for Trans-Ontologies¶ Finally, Mignolo (2000) identiﬁes the space of dialogue as a site of ‘‘border thinking’’ and¶ ‘‘bilanguaging.’’ Anticipating Maldonado-Torres’ (2004) idea of a more radical form of¶ dialogue, bilanguaging is ‘‘a form of life possible in the fractures of a hegemonic (national¶ or imperial) language’’ that ‘‘draw[s] in something that is beyond sound, syntax and¶ lexicon’’ (Mignolo 2000, 264). Margonis (2011a, b) pedagogy of cacophony solicits a form¶ of border thinking and hints at this idea of bilanguanging, but his philosophical framework¶ has not been fractured in ways that would shift us away from the Rousseauean (1994) and¶ Heideggerian (1962) coloniality of being. Dialogical practice as focused intellectual¶ intensity would seem to entail the kind of bilanguaging Mignolo (2000) speaks of here to¶ achieve a decolonial dialogue. This would more fully attend to the way trans-ontologies¶ undermine the coloniality of being enacted through professional philosophy. Taken¶ together, a decolonial trans-ontology is an emergent form of being stemming from a border¶ thinking and bilanguaging.¶ **In the context of the United States and the Americas** more broadly**, it is not only an**¶ **intellectual and pedagogical project that would provide the opportunity for trans-ontologies**¶ **to emerge. An anti-assimilatory pedagogy seeking cacophony would entail a shift in**¶ **location to those physical borders where the complex forms and languages of being**¶ **continuously emerge.** That is, philosophers and teachers would situate themselves where¶ African American youth are not conceived as enigmas. In this sense, Margonis’ (2007,¶ 2011a, b) **teachers would not only seek a cacophonous classroom, but the cacophonous,**¶ **creative, driven and constructive locations of** African American, **Indigenous and Latono/a**¶ **being.** Through radical dialogues in these shifted locations we learn the pre-situations of¶ such youth. Learning with minoritized youth in this way entails forms of bilanguaging¶ wherein European ontologies lose something of their habitability. In those, perhaps ﬂeeting¶ moments, decolonial trans-ontologies are more clearly recognized as the future which¶ denies the coloniality of being.¶ **The processes of radical dialogue** (Maldonado-Torres 2004) **and bilanguaging** (Mignolo¶ 2000) **for trans-ontologies underscores the potentialities of a de-colonial turn in philosophy**¶ **of education. ‘‘The de-colonial turn,’’** writes Maldonado-Torres (2007), **‘‘marks the**¶ **deﬁnitive entry of enslaved and colonized subjectivities into the realm of thought at before**¶ **unknown institutional levels’’** (262). Margonis’ (1999, 2007, 2011a, b) **efforts for antioppressive pedagogical practices and philosophical frameworks serves as an important**¶ **moment in a de-colonial turn in philosophy of education. Continuing with** him **toward a**¶ **critique of the coloniality of being provide a way to move past the terms of enigma and**¶ **primitive to decolonial trans-ontologies in philosophy of education.**

**n anti-colonial discursive framework is key to decolonizing debate and challenging institutionalized power**

**Wane, et. al 9** (Njoki Nathani Wane is the Special Adviser on Status of Women at University of Toronto as Co-Director of Centre for Integrative Anti-Racist Research Studies. ¶ Anne Wagner (featured left) is a professor of Modern and Contemporary ¶ Art at UC-Berkeley. Riyad Shahjahan is an educational administrator at **¶** Michigan State University. “Rekindling the Sacred: Toward a ¶ Decolonizing Pedagogy in Higher Education” Journal of Thought, **¶** Spring-Summer 2009

**We use a critical anti-colonial discursive** framework (Dei & As-ghazadesh, 2001) **to situate our discussion on spirituality and teaching in** higher **education.** It is our belief that **no anti-colonial work would be complete without attending to the spirit, the broken spirit, the spirit that the colonizers managed to convince the colonized subject was poor and in need of salvaging** (see Pearce, 1998; Mazama, 2002). Wane (2006)argues that when missionaries met Indigenous people of the world,the first thing they claimed to notice was the spiritual poverty of thepeople. The missionaries embarked upon a project of decolonization bycontinually eroding and destroying all vestiges of the indigenous people’sspirituality (see Battiste & Henderson, 2000; Some, 1994). **Adopting an anti-colonial discursive theory, it is critical to place issues of spiritual-ity of the colonized people at the center of our discussion** (Shahjahan,2005a). **This framework provides the basis from which to challenge the foundations of institutionalized power and privilege and the power congrautions embedded in ideas, cultures, and histories of knowledge production** (see Dei, 2000).By embracing anti-colonial thought, we acknowledge spiritual practices which have survived the colonial and neo-colonial powers. We view **these acts of survival as forms of resistance that need to be acknowledged and legitimated in the academy.** **Anti-colonial theorizing rises out of alternative, oppositional paradigms, which are in turn based on indigenous concepts and analytical systems and cultural frames of reference** (Dei, 2000). **It recognizes the displacement of spirituality and other non-dominant ways of knowing the world by Western knowledge systems as significant** (Graveline, 1998; Smith, 2001). Hence, as Zine(2004) has written about using an anti-colonial framework to understand issues of spirituality: “**addressing the erasures of spiritual knowledge in academic and discursive contexts is part of an anti-colonial politics of knowledge construction, reclamation, and inclusion**” (p. 5). Furthermore, **the anti-colonial discursive framework provides a political ontology which serves to decolonize academic knowledge and pedagogical practices, by valuing and employing spiritual ways of knowing** (Magnusson, 2004).**Indigenous knowledges are central in the process of de colonization and an important entry point for theorizing issues of spirituality** (seeGraveline, 1998). **Within indigenous cultures, narrative and storytell-ing are primarily pedagogical tools.** In considering how **such practices may contribute to the project of decolonizing the academy,** Iseke-Barnes(2003) contends that: **Through story telling we can highlight how knowledge production in the academy reinforces colonial and neo-colonial relations and the considerable implications of these struggles over knowledge for claims of Indigenousness, agency, and resistance in community activities and academic pursuits focused on cultural vitalization and self-determina-tion.** (p. 218)¶ Building on this understanding, we offer the following narrative, atapestry of dialogical insights into our theorizing of how spirituality may be incorporated into teaching in higher education. This narrative developed as a result of an interactive presentation entitled “EvokingSpirituality in the Academy: A Tool for Decolonization and Transforma-tion for Global Citizens”¶ ¶ presented at an International Transformative Learning Conference, May 2003.

**AT – Science Good**

**1. Extend Shahjahan—science is colonial—their form of evidence analysis produces irrational education which is influenced by interests—we reject science’s relationship with coloniality, not science itself—**

**2. Science can stop oil spills but that’s not the aff’s relationship—the true scientific way to solve would be fighting against oil expropriation**

**3. They read multiple scenarios about science which overwhelm it—colonial discourse normalizes bodies and influences how they think, forming an epistemic lock-in where alternate considerations of the world can’t function**

**Their evidence-based education creates a monocultural approach to knowledge production which serves to exclude minoritized bodies**

**Shahjahan 2011** [Riyad Ahmed, Assistant Professor of Higher, Adult, and Lifelong Education (HALE) at Michigan State University. Ph.D. at the OISE/University of Toronto in Higher Education. “Decolonizing the evidence-based education and policy movement:¶ revealing the colonial vestiges in educational policy, research, and¶ neoliberal reform” Online publication date: 22 March 201, Journal of Education Policy, 26: 2,¶ 181 — 206 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2010.508176>]

**Evidence-based education projects a monoculture in different education systems,**¶ **promotes technical skills and conceptualizes learning as a package** that is transmitted¶ from teacher to students, from government to the public (Hodkinson 2005). Furthermore,¶ **it also pushes minoritized bodies ‘out’ of schooling along the lines of race,**¶ **class, and language, while at the same time reinforcing colonial discourses of the**¶ **‘other.**’ **Fanon** (1967), in summary, aptly describes the colonizing nature of standardized¶ testing on the bodies of teachers and students, whereby their identity is reconfigured¶ into a subjectivity informed by high-stakes testing. He **states**:¶ **Overnight the Negro [educational leaders, teachers and students] has been given …**¶ **frames of references within which he has had to place himself. His metaphysics, or, less**¶ **pretentiously, his customs and the sources on which they were based, were wiped out**¶ **because they were in conflict with a civilization [accountability and high-stakes testing]**¶ **that he did not know and that imposed itself on him**. (Fanon 1967, 110) Similar to earlier colonial discourses, by espousing one standard, **the evidence-based**¶ **education movement maintains control, as there is one goal to work towards and therefore,**¶ **everything is broken down into fitting that goal (**i.e. improving students’ scores¶ in standardized tests). **In summary, such regulations of knowledge production in terms**¶ **of evidence and curriculum are increasingly fixed by evidence-based education that**¶ **perpetuates a monoculture of the mind, where alternative ways of knowing are**¶ **displaced or subjugated**, ‘very much like the introduction of monocultures destroying¶ the very conditions for diverse species to exist’ (Shiva 1995, 12). **Similar to colonial**¶ **discourse, the ideas and meanings attached to evidence and the outcome of education**¶ **are being ‘fixed’** (Hall 1997) **in evidence-based education which perpetuates a monoculture**¶ **of the mind in education that serves the global economy**. Using such a colonial¶ discourse, proponents of evidence-based education are ‘fixing, bounding, and settling’¶ (Cohn 1996, 8) education and those within schooling.

**Their colonial discourse promotes a monoculture of the mind and normalizes bodies to be controlled**

**Shahjahan 2011** [Riyad Ahmed, Assistant Professor of Higher, Adult, and Lifelong Education (HALE) at Michigan State University. Ph.D. at the OISE/University of Toronto in Higher Education. “Decolonizing the evidence-based education and policy movement:¶ revealing the colonial vestiges in educational policy, research, and¶ neoliberal reform” Online publication date: 22 March 201, Journal of Education Policy, 26: 2,¶ 181 — 206 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2010.508176>]

Colonial hierarchies of knowledge and monocultures of the mind¶ **Colonial discourse is also evident among proponents of evidence-based education as**¶ **diverse ways of knowing are not tolerated and a distortion of other ways of knowing**¶ **is continued**. **Colonial discourse promoted a monoculture of the mind to maintain**¶ **control over knowledge production**. For instance, Chilisa (2005) argues that **colonizers**¶ **used research methods to fashion the whole world into sameness in order to dominate**¶ **and suppress the colonized**. Similar to the debate on what constitutes evidence¶ and what should be included as evidence as part of systematic reviews in evidencebased¶ education (see Thomas 2004), **colonial-era investigations into indigenous**¶ **science and technology separated ‘accurate’ and ‘rational’ knowledge from ‘mythology’**¶ (Baber 1996, 159). **Such a hierarchy of knowledge was then used to systematize**¶ **and rank groups of people around the world in terms of ‘intelligence’ in order to**¶ **legitimize domination** (Pratt 1992; Grosfoguel 2007).¶ Throughout proponents’ discourses of evidence-based education, **there is a notion**¶ **of evidence and ‘scientific based research’ that is constantly fixed to mean a certain**¶ **thing**. **This features an emphasis on empirical randomized control experimental**¶ **research studies, surveys, longitudinal studies, and statistical data**. For instance, Slavin¶ associates ‘rigorous research’ with studies that use ‘rigorous experimental methods’¶ (2005, 7). Similarly, the American Educational Research Association Council in July¶ 2008 refers to scientific-based research as ‘the use of rigorous, systematic, and objective¶ methodologies to obtain reliable and valid knowledge.’ The AERA council also¶ outlined what kind of research it prefers for policy-making:¶ The examination of causal questions requires experimental designs using random assignment¶ or quasi-experimental or other designs that substantially reduce plausible competing¶ explanations for the obtained results. These include, but are not limited to,¶ longitudinal designs, case control methods, statistical matching, or time series analyses.¶ This standard applies especially to studies evaluating the impacts of policies and¶ programs on educational outcomes. (<http://www.aera.net/opportunities/?id=6790>) While Slavin explicates what he means by evidence, other authors are not as forthright.¶ **Proponents of evidence-based education use the rhetoric of ‘evidence-based’**¶ **practice and policy.** **This rhetoric leaves out a definition of ‘evidence’ and therefore**¶ **assumes that there is a standardized notion of ‘evidence**.’ **Similarly, colonial discourse**¶ **constructed and produced standardized subjects for rule in order to consolidate**¶ **colonial power despite the heterogeneity among the colonized in terms of their identity**¶ **and knowledge systems** (Rafael 1993; Cohn 1996).¶ While multiple methods are proposed in the evidence-based education movement,¶ there is still a standard of evidence that is espoused, which leads to prediction¶ and control (Lather 2004). **This standard also falls in line with a colonial discourse,**¶ **which does not tolerate diverse ways of knowing**. **Instead, the rhetoric of bias is**¶ **used in the evidence-based education movement to negate other ways of knowing**¶ **so that control is maintained.** For instance, Blunkett (2000) posits that statistically¶ based, experimental research is the preferred method that should be used by¶ evidence-based practitioners since it is less biased by the interests of the researcher.¶ Similarly, a Canadian federal response to an Organization for Economic Cooperation¶ and Development (OECD) conference on evidence-based education describes¶ similar types of evidence that were used for generating evidence for learning¶ policy: The research program consists of analyses of data from national surveys and longitudinal¶ surveys, community based case studies, laboratory simulations, randomized controlled¶ experiments and program evaluation. All of them involve systematic procedures, tests of¶ statistical significance and peer review. Though there may be limitations to each method¶ in the tool kit, multiple lines of evidence are used to build the case for policy … Canada¶ relies on a system of national surveys covering learning from birth to late adulthood.¶ These surveys provide the data for the bulk of the research supporting policy. (Brink¶ 2004, 2) What is significant to point out in this Canadian example is that while the rhetoric of¶ ‘multiple lines of evidence’ is used, the examples cited in this quote are all associated¶ with the empirical realm and are exclusively based on positivistic, quantitative methods.¶ Furthermore, it is quite clear that ‘survey data’ are the most valued means of¶ generating evidence as they provide the ‘bulk’ of evidence supporting federal policy.¶ Similarly **in Britain, three types of evidence are employed in policy decision-making**¶ (Sebba 2004). These include: (1) statistical quantitative data from national surveys¶ that monitor, evaluate, and provide forecast analyses; (2) inspection data generated¶ through Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) inspections; and (3) research¶ evidence derived from externally commissioned projects or programs funded by the¶ government or external bodies, including research councils. ¶ **The types of data collection tools and data, used across these three countries, are**¶ **very similar to the techniques used during the colonial era to establish governmentality.**¶ **Throughout the colonial world, statistical knowledge and surveys were part of**¶ **colonial governmentality.** As Cohn states ‘**A number was, for the British, a particular**¶ **form of certainty to be held on to in a strange world’** (1996, 8). Kalpagam (2000)¶ argues that **the practices of governance by the colonial state in India, and elsewhere,**¶ **ushered in a new ‘quantificatory episteme’** **which promoted the modern statistical**¶ **worldview.** The administrative measures in these colonial states required an immense¶ effort to record information. From the latter half of the nineteenth century, **in the colonial**¶ **state, populations were ‘enumerated, classified, and territorially delineated’ so**¶ **that people could become targets of colonial interventions** (Kalpagam 2000, 49). As¶ statistical techniques developed, it became possible to identify and codify aggregates¶ of population for specific kinds of description and intervention. Similarly, in later¶ centuries, **quantitative research played a key role in naming, taming, and controlling**¶ **the colonized subjects**. Within the Philippines, in the twentieth century, census data¶ were an important component of the American imperial project. As Rafael notes, the¶ power and persuasiveness of a census lie in its amazing capacity to picture in simple,¶ quantitative terms ‘the totality of the world’s multiplicity’ and at the same time appear¶ to be ‘an objective representation of the world’ (1993, 188). **In short, systemic knowledge**¶ **production was a tool of colonial administration that allowed the colonizers to**¶ **name, classify, and control the ‘other’ as well as provide legitimacy to the colonial**¶ **administration.** However, one could pose the question: **Does the use of such research methods**¶ **have colonizing effects in the contemporary educational arena as it did in the past?** I¶ would argue, ‘mostly **yes**.’ In the British context, Stronach (2005) highlighted the fact¶ that 70 complaints about the activities of the Ofsted are made annually. With respect¶ to Ofsted inspections, Stronach reports that:¶ **It privileges an imperative to standardize … It transfers the notion of fairness from the**¶ **individual situation (the child, the school) to a systemic location where it marks the place of the child or the school within national comparisons.** In this way individual ‘aims and¶ characteristics’ are subordinated to measures of average national attainment. And¶ ‘**fairness’ becomes a technical rather than a moral requirement**. (2005, 19)¶ Gillborn points out that British schools need to always demonstrate ‘a good performance¶ in the official statistics’ and ‘continual ‘under-performance’ can trigger a range¶ of sanctions including, ultimately, school closure’ (2005, 19). Ball argues that such¶ British technologies of governance, ‘require individual practitioners to organize themselves¶ as a response to targets, indicators, and evaluations,’ and require them ‘to set¶ aside personal beliefs and commitments and live an existence of calculation’ (2003,¶ 215). Ball further notes that the burden of performativity felt by teachers in this British¶ school, whereby ‘[t]he activities of the new technical intelligentsia, of management,¶ drive performativity into the day-to-day practices of teachers’ (2003, 223). Furthermore,¶ in a study on school leaders in Britain and Canada and the usage of statistical¶ data in decision-making, Earl and Fullan found ‘expressed unhappiness among these¶ school leaders about what they termed the ‘surveillance’ orientation of central government’¶ (2003, 390). They continue:¶ Although leaders were experiencing the value of using data and had many examples of¶ occasions when data provided them with insights and motivation to address a problem,¶ they were plagued by worries, because of the climate of surveillance, that the data would¶ come back to ‘bite’ them at some point. This tension was particularly evident in contexts¶ of large-scale centralised reform. (Earl and Fullan 2003, 391) This **top-down mechanism of research used in policy decision-making takes agency**¶ **away from school leaders to interpret and make their own decisions based on data.** As¶ Earl and Fullan state, ‘When the data are locally developed, leaders still are able to¶ decide how to use it and who should see it. When the data are public, there is no escaping¶ the release of data and needing to respond to questions and concerns that come¶ from various constituents’ (2003, 392). Hence, **through these colonial discourses, not**¶ **only is the concept of evidence being ‘fixed,’ but also the research techniques used are**¶ **being standardized for policy decision-making**. **This ‘fixing’ has colonizing ramifications**¶ **on schools, educational leaders, and teachers, in that they are all objectified.**¶ I need to be clear that my argument here is not suggesting that **quantitative research**¶ **techniques**, surveys, or Ofsted inspection are in themselves colonizing in nature. The¶ point here is that they **have been the predominant tool used for technologies of governance**¶ **in colonial rule, and continue to have similar functions and effects in the**¶ **evidence-based movement**. **These technologies of accountability are also racialized**¶ **and gendered in their impacts on students and teachers** (see Ball 2003; Lipman 2003;¶ Gillborn 2005; Kerr 2006). **They serve the function of standardizing the subjects of**¶ **knowledge and function as tools of governmentality.** Beyond the question of ‘evidence,’ **evidence-based education also espouses a**¶ **certain conception of educational practice and policy which does not tolerate diversity**¶ (i.e. diverse bodies and knowledge forms) **and thus promotes a monoculture of the**¶ **mind.** **It perpetuates a standardized curriculum** (i.e. a standardized form of knowledge),¶ **student, and teacher subjectivity,** through the culture of high-stakes testing and¶ accountability. As scholars have noted, there has been a growing emphasis on highstakes¶ testing and accountability culture in the current neoliberal climate in Canada,¶ Britain, and the USA which leads to the standardization of education and learning (Hill¶ 2004; Lipman 2004; Hursh 2007; Majhanovich 2008). For instance, in the USA, recent studies have argued that the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) policy’s focus on highstakes¶ testing has drastic effects, including: limiting teachers’ flexibility and becoming¶ more lecture-based, leaving little time to explore different learning styles, narrowing¶ curricula content to the tests, pushing minoritzed students (along the lines of race, class,¶ and language) out of schooling in order to increase test scores, and bolstering the¶ achievement gap between majoritized/minoritized students (McNeil 2000; Lipman¶ 2002, 2004; Valenzuela 2005; Au 2007; Hursh 2007; Biramiah 2008). In a recent study¶ examining third and fourth grade standardized tests of 11 states, Viruru (2009) discovered¶ a qualitative difference in the representations of European-Americans and people¶ of color. These tests, according to Viruru, depicted European-Americans as normal,¶ while ‘colonialists images of people of color’ (2009, 101) were perpetuated by which¶ people of color were ‘deemed … exotic, less resourceful, passive and waiting for¶ change to come’ (2009, 115). In short, a high-stakes performativity and accountability¶ culture is fixing and consolidating monocultural ways of knowing and being in US¶ schooling, while simultaneously colonizing diverse ways of knowing and being.

**2NC Perm Block+**

**1. The perm severs the justifications and epistemic grounding of the aff – that’s a voter, it makes the aff a moving target meaning we can never win**

**7. Empirically, state-based movements are co-opted or repressed**

**Lind 2012** [Amy Lind, Mary Ellen Heintz Endowed Chair and Associate Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, University of Cincinnati “Intimate Governmentalities, the Latin American Left, and the Decolonial Turn.” feminists@law, Vol 2, No 1 (2012) https://journals.kent.ac.uk/kent/index.php/feministsatlaw/article/view/43/115]

Breny **Mendoza raises several key questions about the** turn to the left and/or the **decolonial turn in Latin America**, particularly as this transformation is playing out in Honduras. As she points out, **in** **Honduras social movements are at the forefront of resistance not only to the coup but also to various forms of modern/colonial powe**r. Like in Honduras, **in countries that have shifted to the left** at the state level (e.g., Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela), **many activists** and critical scholars **have pointed out the multiple processes taking place simultaneously,** and as part of this, **the ongoing contradictions among** the goals of social movements and those of socialist **states. The move by indigenous movements** and other activists, as well as that of cultural studies scholars, **to rethink the dualisms** that so pervade colonial/modern logic, **including that of (neo)developmentalism**, capital and citizenship, **is** perhaps **at the center of the many ongoing struggles we see concerning how to imagine** and institutionalize “**another world.” This** “another world” **has been addressed in various ways, from theorizing another form of production to producing alternative form(s) of knowledge – questions that have great ontological, epistemological and political significance,** at least when posed by those interested in a truly decolonial turn. As Breny alludes to, the Honduran resistance movement’s emphasis on constitutional reform exemplifies the strategy used by other left-turning governments to remake the nation. Much of the emphasis, at least originally and on the surface, has been on Latin American states’ shift away from the global neoliberal agenda; that is, on the anti-neoliberal or post-neoliberal turn. As Arturo Escobar points out (2010), **Latin America was the first region to undergo structural adjustment measures – of the most extreme kind**, inspired by Harvard University’s Jeffrey Sachs – **and** also the first **where states so widely adopted** (often forcibly) a World Bank/IMF inspired neoliberal restructuring agenda. Yet more recently it was also the first to resist the inequalities emerging from that process and from modern/colonial capitalism more generally, including perhaps most notably in the turn to the left, which we have now seen in up to twelve countries, or about two-thirds of the region, to varying degrees.¶ I want to respond to Breny’s commentary by focusing on an example of constitutional reform that has already occurred: namely, that of the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution and the broader revolución ciudadana that President Rafael Correa (2007-present) has promoted. I’ll also bring in some examples from the 2008 Bolivian constitution and Evo Morales’ MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) administration (2006-present). As I have followed the debates within social movements and in the constitutional assembly process, a few key disjunctures stand out, including the following: (1) the well-known disjuncture between the turn to the left and the decolonial turn; (2) a lack of analysis of the governance of intimacy (Lind 2010a) and biopolitics in both leftist and decolonial accounts of “another world”; and (3) decolonial vs. liberal challenges posed by activists in the remaking of Latin American nations.¶ First, for the most part I would argue that the Ecuadorian state is not participating in a decolonial turn but rather in a turn to a leftist form of alternative modernization, akin to Chavez’s production regime in Venezuela, Morales’ in Bolivia, and Bachelet’s center-leftist concertación in Chile (among possible others). I state this with the caveat that of course **one can find many examples of decolonial strategies in Ecuador**, including in the constitution itself, **yet mostly the** Ecuadorian **state is focused on alternative modernization.** As in Bolivia, Venezuela and Chile, the Ecuadorian **state has continued to rely on the extraction of hydrocarbons** and other resources; this is so **despite the fact that the 2008 Constitution grants nature equal rights to human beings and generally advocates “well-being” over economic growth** (“well being” being the translation of sumaq kawsay in Quichua or el buen vivir in Spanish). And to make matters worse – what analysts could not have predicted when the Correa administration was first inaugurated – **when indigenous communities have resisted the state’s developmentalist presence**, including its ongoing exploitation of nature and endorsement of the nature/culture dualism despite the new constitutional language**, they have been repressed**. Most sectors of the organized indigenous movement have been alienated by the Correa administration; currently there is little dialogue between the two. And although **Bolivian President Morales** himself identifies as indígena, he too **has alienated indigenous and peasant communities in Eastern lowland Bolivia** concerning his administration’s plans to build a highway on their land – a direct blow to local communities and also a denial of his own constitution’s declaration of nature as having constitutional rights. In Chile, **indigenous protestors of Bachelet’s policies were arrested and labeled as terrorists** (Richards in press). **What these leaders are discovering** (or perhaps what they are having confirmed) is **that while they can create an anti-neoliberal agenda, they cannot necessarily create a post-capitalist economy based on non-capitalist forms of social and economic life**, nor a post-liberal order that transcends liberal classifications of identity. There are glimpses of this, within the state and outside. For example Ecuador’s National Plan of Living Well attempts to institutionalize the “solidarity economy” alongside the capitalist economy, and the 2008 Constitution provided for an Inequality Council which would, in theory, address five axes of inequality based on race, ethnicity, ability and gender in an intersectional and transversal way. **This has yet to be institutionalized**, however. Moreover, **we can see clear attempts within social movements to create a post-capitalist economy that challenges the modern/colonial versions of governmentality found in these states. But regardless one must distinguish between the political ideals of 21st century socialism** envisioned by social movements, on one hand, **and** on the other, the kinds of **governmentalities created by these socialist states.**

**AT – Perm**

**Perm fails – non-Western knowledge will be appropriated to strengthen colonial hegemony**

**Breidlid 13** (Anders, Professor, Master programme in Multicultural and International Education, Oslo University College, “Education, Indigenous Knowledge, and Development in the Global South”, p. 52-53)OG

In a sense, Freire’s (1970) theorizing of **the dialogic nature of knowledge**¶ **production** is important here, but it **requires that both parties in the dialogue** **acknowledge that there is wisdom and important knowledges to be**¶ **gathered from the other dialogue partner.** **There is a need to acknowledge the significance of contextual, localized, and spiritual knowledges, in educational institutions, in the world of aid, and in societies in the South at large simply because the current epistemic hegemony is not able, as has**¶ **been repeatedly noted, to address these issues in a sustainable way alone.** It is with this perspective that White suggests the importance of an alterna-¶ tive Western knowledge system derived from the teachings of St. Francis,¶ which I propose to call the Francisization of Western knowledge produc-¶ tion.7 There is a sense that the **negotiation of a third space** in relation to¶ CHAT, which encompasses different knowledge systems **may be facilitated**¶ **with** the inclusion of, or the **appropriation of,** aspects of this **alternative**¶ Western **knowledge into the hegemonic one**. There are, however, difficul-¶ ties with such an appropriation /inclusion due to the hegemonic power/¶ knowledge syndrome and also because of a heavy historical legacy.

**5. Your epistemology bad arguments don’t apply– ours is grounded and backed with empirical data**

**Escobar 8** (Arturo. May 27. Third World Quarterly. Beyond the Third World: imperial¶ globality, global coloniality and antiglobalisation social movements. Third World Quarterly, Vol 25, No 1, pp 207–230)

**The conceptualisation of modernity/coloniality is grounded in a series of**¶ **operations that distinguish it from established theories**. **These include: 1)**¶ **locating the origins of modernity with the conquest of America and the control**¶ **of the Atlantic after 1492, rather than in the most commonly accepted landmarks**¶ **such as the Enlightenment or the end of the 18th century; 2) attention to**¶ **colonialism, postcolonialism and imperialism as constitutive of modernity; 3) the**¶ **adoption of a world perspective in the explanation of modernity, in lieu of a**¶ **view of modernity as an intra-European phenomenon**; 4**) the identiﬁcation of the**¶ **domination of others outside the European core as a necessary dimension of**¶ **modernity; 5) a conception of eurocentrism as the knowledge form of modernity/**¶ **coloniality—a hegemonic representation and mode of knowing that claims**¶ **universality for itself, ‘derived from Europe’s position as center’.31 In sum, there**¶ **is a re-reading of the ‘myth of modernity’ in terms of modernity’s ‘underside’**¶ **and a new denunciation of the assumption that Europe’s development must be**¶ **followed unilaterally by every other culture, by force if necessary—what Dussel**¶ **terms ‘the developmentalist fallac**y’.32 The main conclusions are, ﬁrst, that **the**¶ **proper analytical unit of analysis is modernity/coloniality—in sum, there is no**¶ **modernity without coloniality, with the latter being constitutive of the former.**¶ **Second, the fact that ‘the colonial difference’ is a privileged epistemological and**¶ **political space. In other words, what emerges from this alternative framework is**¶ **the need to take seriously the epistemic force of local histories and to think**¶ **theory through the political praxis of subaltern groups.**

**Science is not neutral but dominated by the West—the US will merely use their tech developments to increase weaponry**

**Foladori, 11** – 1ac author and Profesor de la Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas (Guillermo, “U.S. Military Involvement in Mexican Science and Technology” 11/5, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/u-s-military-involvement-in-mexican-science-and-technology/27476>) **MEMS = Microelectrical Mechanical Systems; NEMS=Nanoelectrical Mechanical Systems, SNL = Sandia National Labs**

**Scientific knowledge is controlled and regulated by the USA** (Pedersen, 1989) – **something that has no equal in the countries of Latin America. As a result, Latin American scientists work in partnership with American military institutions with little or no oversight by publicly-funded S&T institutions**. **Regardless of the civilian application of the research** – and this is not in all cases – **the development of military industry in the USA results in acts of war and in military products**. Here **we have revealed a widespread example, that of the agreements between the Sandia National Laboratories, with which CONACYT has a significant partnership, and various CONACYT research centers who have their own specific accords; but there also exist less obvious agreements between universities or research centers of CONACYT and other military centers in the USA** such as the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, or the Brookhaven National Laboratories in New York; **and this is only in the narrow example of MEMS / NEMS research initiative**s.

**Specifically in energy sectors, technology is entrenched in political concepts—highly technical concepts are associated with the masculine while barring the knowledge from feminine recipients**

**Roehr 1**

(Ulrike, Gender and Energy in the North, Background Paper for the Expert Workshop¶ "Gender Perspectives for Earth Summit 2002: Energy, Transport, Information for Decision-Making, 1/12/2001)

As a sphere related to technology, **energy is a highly male dominated issue**4. **Because of the predominating**¶ **division of labour by gender**, **women are represented marginally** in this domain. **Professional**¶ **access** to the energy sector **is mainly based on a scientific or engineering education, in which women are extremely under-represented.** The **fields of skilled trade** relevant to the energy sector **such as construction**,¶ electric installation, plumbing, and installation of heating systems **are male domains, too.**¶Therefore, the influence of women on concepts, planning, decision-making, and implementation is¶ limited. This is true both for research and development, and for technical realization. (see chapter II.6)¶ Moreover, **energy is considered as dangerous and risky, in terms of the risks of nuclear power**, as well¶ as for electricity in private households. **Boys are expected to face and master these dangers. Whereas**¶ **they are encouraged to get acquainted with electricity step by step**, **girls are kept away not only from**¶ **electric power but also from the power of knowledge.** (Conrads/Uhlenbusch 1990, Hoffmann 1990)¶ **As a result of this socialization**, **a clear gender separation is found as regards energy equipment** **and¶ environmental friendly energy use** in private households: Men are primarily considered to be responsible¶ for the technical side and the investments in thermal insulation of homes, boilers, and hot water¶ installations. In contrast to this, women are expected to save energy based on behaviour, and to¶ communicate the necessary rules of conduct to the rest of the family, such as abstaining from the use¶ of electric applications, reasonable loading of washing machines and dishwashers, etc., similar to¶ other environmental fields5. (Doerr 1993, Buko 1995, Schwarau-Schuldt 1990)

**The problem isn’t the nuclear threat—it’s the politicized framing of it—the aff’s fantastic depiction of nuclear terrorists align the “responsibility” of owning pre-emptive weaponry towards the colonizers**

**Hecht 2003** [Gabrielle, Professor Department of History, University of Michigan, “Globalization Meets Frankenstein?¶ Reflections On Terrorism, Nuclearity, And¶ Global Technopolitical Discourse” History and Technology, 2003 Vol. 19(1) pp. 1-8, accessed via Ebsco]

At various moments, **Western nuclear powers have censured India, Pakistan, North Korea,**¶ **South Africa, Iran, Iraq, and Israel for their efforts to acquire nuclear weaponry. Bush’s "axis**¶ **of evil**" phrase **is only the most recent version of a longstanding discourse in which nuclearity**¶ **was defined as appropriate for some nations but not for others.** In return, these¶ inappropriately nuclear nations have condemned the NPT and IAEA safeguards as neo-¶ colonial. Thus the nuclear and the post-colonial both confront and depend on each other¶ repeatedly in a battle for geopolitical legitimacy. The **regimes of discourse** produced in these¶ confrontations **shape the possibilities for action, insistence on the illegitimacy of "third" or**¶ **"second" world nuclear aspirations means**, in effect, **that attempts to persuade** these nations¶ not to develop nuclear weapons **are decried as neo-colonial, and are therefore themselves**¶ **illegitimate.** **Because the dichotomies of nuclear rupture-talk tend to erase national or**¶ **regional political complexities and insist on a rupture from colonial relations**, they have¶ become – somewhat paradoxically – worse than useless in non-proliferation efforts.¶ On another front, consider the US's latest anti-ballistic missile defense fantasies. These¶ descend directly from unrequited Cold War lusts embodied in systems such as SAGE and¶ SDI. These systems never worked to fulfill their stated purpose of automatically tracking and¶ shooting down incoming bombers (in the case of SAGE) or missiles from space (in the case¶ of SDI)-though they did work in other, political and economic ways. There’s ample¶ evidence that the latest version of a protective shield won't work either: its detection systems¶ can’t tell the most basic differences between a decoy and a warhead. There's also good¶ reason to think it won't work politically, These problems don't seem to bother most¶ lawmakers in Capitol Hill or the White House, however. Insisting on the "post-ness" of the¶ post-Cold War world, **ABM proponents argue that these systems will defend America from**¶ **"rogue states," despite bloody evidence that "states" aren't necessarily our worst enemy, and**¶ **that you don't in fact need a nuclear missile** (or even biological or chemical weaponry) **to**¶ **terrify a superpower**. No matter: the **fantasists have** apparently **persuaded the nation to cling**¶ **bravely to the conviction that technopolitical power can be circumscribed** and fully specified;¶ that despite the "diabolical" clevemess of turning box-cutters and airplanes into extra-¶ ordinarily effective weapons, **the true threat comes from those good old Cold War**¶ **technologies: missiles and weapons of mass destruction.**¶ Here the "axis of evil" slogan helps the fantasist cause mightily, since it defines states that¶ could-if they were stupid and insane enough-manage to lob a missile over to US territory.¶ Of course, since **even the fantasists must admit that missile defense doesn't currently work**,¶ Bush and his Dr Strangeloves have several new plans allegedly aimed at foiling such scenarios.¶ Plan A: attack Iraq. The justifications for such an attack oscillate. Some days Iraq's potential¶ possession of nuclear weapons gets trotted out. When the imminence of Iraqi nuclearity is¶ contested, the need for a "regime change" is invoked, At this writing, the fate of Plan A is very¶ much up in the air, And debates about it have deflected attention from Plan B, which is in some¶ ways bigger, more sweeping, and likely to keep the military-industrial complex happy for years¶ to come: the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). In this latest manifestation of nuclear¶ rupture-talk, the US would develop tactical nuclear weapons to burrow into underground¶ bunkers in which the "axis of evil" might be confectioning nuclear. chemical. or biological¶ weapons. (This is not the only aim of the NPR, but I`lI limit myself to this for this paper.) Plan¶ B seemed to surprise observers, but as recently as October 2001 congressman Steven Buyer¶ eerily presaged elements of the NPR when he advocated plugging up Afghan caves with¶ tactical nuclear weapons-an idea also favored by several other Republican representatives.¶ Plan B has been both decried and praised as a post- (or post-post-?) Cold War plan: either way.¶ observers view the NPR as technopolitical mpture. Its opponents claim that this is the first time¶ the US has contemplated using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States; they forget Korea¶ and Vietnam. Proponents claim that September ll signaled the death-knell of traditional¶ nuclear deterrence; in the era of suicide bombers, nuclear retaliation is no longer a protective¶ threat. They funher insist that such mini-nukes (a cutesy designation to soften the blow?),¶ aimed at burrowing deep underground, wouldn`t cause widespread radioactive devastationÂ»-¶ this in the face of clear evidence that such weapons could never go deep enough to be¶ significantly contained.¶ Like its predecessors, this **latest manifestation of nuclear rupture-talk is aimed at soothing**¶ and/or terrifying **its audience**. And like its predecessors, what it decidedly does not do is leave¶ room for complexities. The portion of the NPR aimed at "rogue states" leapfrogs over the¶ deterrent posed by the doctrine of mutually assured destruction because these states don 't¶ have arsenals the size of Russia’s. In initial public discussions of the NPR there was-¶ weirdly, given September 11-no sense that other forms of retaliation might be possible**. No**¶ **sense that states subjected to nuclear attack might have angry friends**. Certainly no admission¶ of the ways in which imperial power regimes remain embedded in our own technopolitical¶ systems. And ongoing total incomprehension of why and how former empires might want to¶ Strike back.¶ **Just as the stark dichotomies posited by the Cold War world got fuzzier the closer you**¶ **examined them, so too for today's dichotomies.** Consider my personal favorite: the line¶ between nuclear and non-nuclear. I’ve argued that even during the Cold War it was not in fact¶ all that clear what was nuclear diplomacy and what wasn't. But in those good old days, you¶ knew what nuclear weapons were (or at least you thought you did). Now, it's not so apparent.¶ **Do munitions loaded up with depleted uranium count as "nuclear"? Not if you're NATO or**¶ **the U.S. using them in the Balkans or the Gulf** War. **But if you’re a terrorist contemplating**¶ **packing a bomb with radioactive material purchased on the black market, you’ve violated a**¶ **fundamental taboo**. By crossing the nuclear/non-nuclear divide, you`ve committed an act of¶ pollution: you’ve made a "dirty bomb." (One does wonder which bombs are the clean ones.)¶ **What qualities such bombs as "dirty" is not so much the technical infraction of mixing the**¶ **"nuclear" with the "conventional" but rather the technopolitics of who’s doing the mixing**.¶ how, and to what ends. The stubborn persistence of global technopolitical hierarchies figures¶ here in important ways, most interestingly in the "how" part: calling these bombs "dirty"¶ signals not just moral outrage at technological pollution, but also disdain for the inability of¶ the bomb builders to produce a "real" nuclear weapon.¶ **My point**, of course, is **not that it should be acceptable for terrorists to make radioactive**¶ **weapons** of any kind, or that Saddam Hussein should be allowed to develop weapons of mass¶ destruction. **Rather, it’s that the current shape of global technopolitics has deep roots in the**¶ **dialectics between nuclear and post-colonial rupture-talk, between nuclear and post-colonial**¶ **technopolitics. These** dialectics have **defined the parameters for global power relations**, and¶ shaped geopolitical subjectivities in multiple registers and in ways whose significance we¶ have barely begun to grasp, lf we are indeed in a "post" or a "post-post-" Cold War world.¶ then it’s the same kind of "post-ness" that we find in the "post-colonial." The **infrastructures**¶ **and discourses of Cold War technopolitics continue to shape the parameters of global and**¶ **local action, just as the infrastructures and discourses of colonialism do**, We ignore those¶ roots-and the contradictions they produce-at our peril.¶

**Latin American groups are epistemically breaking out now—ideas threatening basic Western rationality are impossible for the state to control**

**Mignolo 5,** (Walter, (Walter, Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at Duke University, The Idea of

Latin Americ, BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, 2005)

¶ Today, **“Latin” America** (as an idea) **occupies an ambiguous position¶ in the imaginary of the modern/colonial world**. **It serves as an¶ imaginary that is defended, from different loci of enunciation,** by¶ state officers, journalists, and intellectuals who see themselves as¶ “Latin Americans,” **meaning**, for them**, a distinctive identification in¶ the Western triangulation of Western and Southern Europe** and the¶ US. For dissenting Creoles, Mestizos/as, and immigrants of European¶ descent, the “idea” of Latin America is believed to provide a unified¶ front to confront the growing military, economic, and technological¶ invasion coming from the US. The **problem is that**, at the same time,¶ **Black and Indigenous communities are fighting for the same cause**¶ (particularly the growing Indigenous forces around the struggle¶ against Free Trade of the Americas); **but** they **are not doing it in¶ the name of “Latin” America, since “Latin” Americans have also been their exploiters**. Indigenous groups struggle in the same area¶ under the name of Abya-Yala, and Blacks look for other, less territorial¶ identifications, like the clear memory of slavery and their¶ construction as “less than human” by Europeans, Creoles, and immigrants¶ alike. **Shifting the geography** and the biography **of reason is¶ a dangerous move for the hegemonic order of things; it means the¶ co-existence of the “subjective understanding,**” again in Wynter’s¶ words, **of social** and economic **organization, which is not good for¶ those anchored in hegemonic ways of life**. Political **insurrections¶ could be totally or partially controlled by a powerful army. Ideas¶ that threaten the rationality of military interventions, justified crime,¶ and the paradigm of newness** (spreading democracy, freedom,¶ markets) **are more difficult** to control. They can be slowed down,¶ but not killed. In the “world order” submitted by Samuel Huntington, opposing¶ **civilizations teeter on the brink of a “clash” and “Latin” America¶ has been generating, as of late, much of what can be slowed down¶ but not stopped**. What Huntington doesn’t see, or doesn’t want to¶ see, is that the “challenge” is not just that of the Hispanic crowd¶ invading the Anglo yard. Likewise, in the case of Islam, the challenge¶ is not just from terrorism that threatens “American” lives. **The real¶ challenge is that, beyond the Hispanic c**rowd and terrorist bombs,¶ **there are Muslims and Latinos/as changing the geo-politics of¶ knowledge**. You can justify the killing of terrorists, but it is more¶ difficult to justify or enact the paralysis of the thinking of Latino/a¶ and Islamic thinkers, working toward a paradigm of co-existence¶ and shifting the geo-graphies of knowledge and of social organization.¶ **Huntington’s conception of Latin America, and his inference¶ about Hispanics, is unabashedly based on an ontological idea of¶ “Latin” America and of “Hispanics.” He writes:** Latin America, however, has a distinct identity which differentiates

it from the West. [Remember Deloria?] **Although an¶ offspring of European civilization**, **Latin America has evolved¶ along a very different path** from Europe and North America.¶ It has had a corporatist, authoritarian culture, which Europe¶ had to a much lesser degree and North America not at all¶ [sic!]. Europe and North America both felt the effects of the Reformation and have combined Catholic and Protestant cultures.¶ Historically, although this may be changing, Latin America¶ has been only Catholic. Latin American **civilization incorporates¶ indigenous cultures, which did not exist in Europe, [and] were¶ effectively wiped out in North America .** **. .** Latin America could¶ be considered either a sub-civilization within Western civilization¶ or a separate civilization closely affiliated with the West¶ and divided as to whether it belongs in the West. For an analysis¶ focused on the international political implications of civilizations,¶ **including the relations between Latin America**, on the one hand, **and¶ North America** and Europe, on the other, **the latter is the more appropriate¶ and useful designation**.33

**3. The state can’t solve the alt—the stances of indigenous and minorities groups are channeled into un-enforced writing—only a rethinking of Western political processes solves**

**Aparicio 2011** [Juan Ricardo, Associate Professor Department of Languages ​​and Sociocultural Studies University of the Andes, “Reply To Arturo Escobar's ‘Latin America at a Crossroads: Alternative Modernizations, Post-Liberalism, or Post-Development?” Cultural Studies¶ Volume 25, Issue 3, 2011 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09502386.2010.527156#.UfbYqI21Fsl]

In fact, **a whole scholarly literature in Latin America has precisely analyzed how the popular demands of indigenous, afro-descendant and minority groups were channeled into the traditional framework of liberal democracies** and constitutions in the 1990s (Ochoa 2003, Hale 2005, Gros 2000). Not coincidentally, **these same transformations were taking place with the subtle arrival and sedimentation of neo-liberal policies of the World Bank** and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under the scripts of ‘participation’, ‘descentralization’, ‘flexibilization’ and ‘good governance’. For these commentators, in this ‘perverse confluence’ (Dagnino) between constitutional transformations and the popular demands, the ‘radical difference’ was cancelled and tamed under the guise of the multicultural state (Alvarez 2008). In fact, **one could argue that the reconfigured ‘state-form’ was able to reterritorialize these vectors into new consensuses** while losing their radical drive. But one could again ask: is this all the story? Thus the state apparatus of capture completely tamed difference? Or does the capture completely control and regulate the speeds and intensities of these vectors? And for those of us in the academy, how should one think and write about these processes and transformations?¶ For sure, Arturo Escobar's 2010 groundbreaking article on the recent transformations taking place ‘at the State level’ in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia raises these same crucial interrogations with even more acuteness As he argues right in the beginning, posing a formidable challenge to academics working in these areas, ‘**how one thinks about these processes is itself an object of struggle and debate’** (Escobar 2010, p. 3). And he adds: ‘**Is it possible to suggest ways of thinking about the ongoing transformations that neither shortcut their potential** by interpreting them through worn out categories, **not that aggrandize their scope** by imputing them utopias that might be far from the desires and actions of the main actors involved?’ With these warnings, **the author continues to narrate the possibilities** and limits **of these transformations taking place in these three countries to eradicate** and transform **the traditional liberal and modern framework of these state-forms**. He recognizes two major current socio-economic, political and cultural transformations taking place in the country. The first one is the one of alternative modernizations that ‘stems from the end of the hegemony of the neo-liberal project but does not engage significantly with the second aspect of the conjuncture … , **the hegemony of Euro-modernity;** (b) [the second one], decolonial projects, **based on a different set of practices** (e.g. communal, indigenous, hybrid, and above all, pluriversal and intercultural), leading to a post-liberal society (an alternative to Euro-modernity). **This second project stems from the second aspect of the conjuncture and seeks to transform neoliberalism and development from this perspective’** (Escobar 2010, p. 11). With these arguments that seem to reproduce the essential contradiction pointed above around Laclau's work, this is, between the fundamental tension between the ‘power bloc’ and the popular, or between ‘democracy’ and radical difference, and I might add, in their ontological and epistemological dimensions, **Escobar's argument seems to move between the classic Gramscian move of the ‘pessimistic of the intellect’ and ‘the optimism of the will’. He even argues that his argument at this stage deals more about potentiality** (about the field of the virtual) than about ‘how things really are’. But nevertheless, he still maintains the warning that even those vectors of potentiality or about the field the virtual are never free from any contradictions or tensions.

**Dis**

**1. Disease are short term – They evolve to be benign.**

**AMNH 98** The American Museum of Natural History “How did Hyperdisease cause extinctions?” http://www.amnh.org/science/biodiversity/extinction/Day1/disease/Bit2.html

It is well known that lethal diseases can have a profound effect on species' population size and structure. However, it is generally accepted that the principal populational effects of disease are acute--that is, short-term. In other words, although a species many suffer substantial loss from the effects of a given highly infectious disease at a given time, the facts indicate that natural populations tend to bounce back after the period of high losses. Thus, disease as a primary cause of extinction seems implausible. However, this is the normal case, where the disease-provoking pathogen and its host have had a long relationship. Ordinarily, it is not in the pathogens interest to rapidly kill off large numbers of individuals in its host species, because that might imperil its own survival. Disease theorists long ago expressed the idea that pathogens tend to evolve toward a "benign" state of affairs with their hosts, which means in practice that they continue to infect, but tend not to kill (or at least not rapidly). A very good reason for suspecting this to be an accurate view of pathogen-host relationships is that individuals with few or no genetic defenses against a particular pathogen will be maintained within the host population, thus ensuring the pathogen's ultimate survival.

**2. No terminal impact – Too fast or too slow.**

**The Independent 03** “Future Tense: Is Mankind Doomed?” http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0725-04.htm

Maybe - though plenty of experienced graduate students could already have a stab. But nature knows that infectious diseases are very hard to get right. Only HIV/Aids has 100 per cent mortality, and takes a long time to achieve it. By definition, lethal diseases kill their host. If they kill too quickly, they aren't passed on; if too slowly, we can detect them and isolate the infected. Any mutant smallpox or other handmade germ would certainly be too deadly or too mild. And even SARS killed fewer people worldwide than die on Britain's roads in a week. As scares go, this one is ideal - overblown and unrealistic.

**3. No risk of big impact – Quarantines check.**

**Pharma Investments**, Ventures & Law Weekly **05** “SARS; Quarantine is cost saving and effective in containing emerging infections” Lexis

Quarantine is cost saving and effective in containing emerging infections. "Over time, quarantine has become a classic public health intervention and has been used repeatedly when newly emerging infectious diseases have threatened to spread throughout a population. "Here, we weigh the economic costs and benefits associated with implementing widespread quarantine in Toronto during the SARS outbreaks of 2003," scientists writing in the Journal of Infection report. "We compared the costs of two outbreak scenarios: in Scenario A, SARS is able to transmit itself throughout a population without any significant public health interventions. In Scenario B, quarantine is implemented early on in an attempt to contain the virus. "By evaluating these situations, we can investigate whether or not the use of quarantine is justified by being either cost-saving, life saving, or both," wrote A.G. Gupta and colleagues at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. "Our results indicate that quarantine is effective in containing newly emerging infectious diseases, and also cost saving when compared to not implementing a widespread containment mechanism," the authors said. Gupta concluded, "This paper illustrates that it is not only in our humanitarian interest for public health and healthcare officials to remain aggressive in their response to newly emerging infections, but also in our collective economic interest. Despite somewhat daunting initial costs, quarantine saves both lives and money." Gupta and colleagues published their study in the Journal of Infection (The economic impact of quarantine: SARS in Toronto as a case study. J Infect, 2005;50(5):386-393).

**4. A virus has never actually killed off any species.**

**N**ew **Y**ork **T**imes **97** May 18, “Pathogens of Glory” http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00E6DA1639F93BA25756C0A961958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2

Despite such horrific effects, Dr. Peters is fairly anti-apocalyptic when it comes to the ultimate import of viruses. Challenging the widespread perception that exotic viruses are doomsday agents bent on wiping out the human species, he notes that ''we have not documented that viruses have wiped out any species.'' As for the notion that we're surrounded by ''new'' diseases that never before existed, he claims that ''most new diseases turn out to be old diseases''; one type of hantavirus infection, he suggests, goes back to A.D. 960. And in contrast to the popular belief that viral epidemics result from mankind's destruction of the environment, Dr. Peters shows how the elimination of a viral host's habitat can eradicate a killer virus and prevent future epidemics. This is what happened when the Aswan Dam, completed in 1971, destroyed the floodwater habitat of the Aedes aegypti mosquitoes, carriers of Rift Valley fever virus: ''After the Aswan Dam was constructed, there was no more alluvial flooding. . . . Without a floodwater mosquito, the virus can't maintain itself over the long haul. . . . By 1980, Rift Valley fever had essentially disappeared in Egypt.'' Still, Dr. Peters isn't totally averse to doomsday thinking, and in his final chapter he lays out his own fictional disease scenario, in which a mystery virus from Australia suddenly breaks out in a Bangkok slum. Throw in Malthus, chaos theory and the high mutation rates of RNA viruses, and soon he's got the world teetering on the brink of viral holocaust in the finest Hollywood tradition. But he doesn't know quite what to make of his own scenario. He offers ''one valid, simplified equation to describe what we can expect from viruses in the future'': mutating viruses plus a changing ecology plus increasing human mobility add up to more and worse infectious diseases. Two pages later, though, he says that ''it is impossible to gauge how the actions of man will impact on emerging infectious diseases.'' If that is true, it discredits the very equation he's given us. In the end, he presents no clear or consistent picture of the overall threat posed by the viruses he discusses. The empirical fact of the matter is that today's most glamorous viruses -- Marburg and Ebola -- have killed minuscule numbers of people compared with the staggering death rates of pathogens that go back to disease antiquity. Marburg virus, discovered in 1967, has been known to kill just 10 people in its 30-year history; Ebola has killed approximately 800 in the 20 years since it appeared in 1976. By contrast, malaria, an ancient illness, still kills a worldwide average of one million people annually -- more than 2,700 per day. More than three times as many people die of malaria every day than have been killed by Ebola virus in all of history. Yet it's Ebola that people find ''scary''!

**5. Focusing on one area is useless.**

Scott **Barrett 05** School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins U, “Transnational Public Goods for Health” http://www.gpgtaskforce.org/uploads/files/65.doc

You might think that the control of an infectious disease must be a global public good. However, the situation is actually more complicated than this. Consider, to begin, a situation in which an infectious disease is endemic everywhere. If the disease were highly infectious, that means that almost every person could expect to be infected. Under these circumstances, a small increase in control by one country would have no effect anywhere else. That control would not be a global public good.

# 1NR

**If stringing together internal-links yields an infinite impact, policy debate becomes a race to the bottom—Paving over clashes of context and assumptions transforms predictions into vacuous mush.**

David M. **Berube 2000**

Associate Professor of Speech Communication and Director of Debate at the University of South Carolina. Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 21: 53-73 http://www.cedadebate.org/CAD/index.php/CAD/article/viewFile/248/232

The lifeblood of contemporary contest debating may be the extended argument. An extended argument is any argument requiring two or more distinct causal or correlational steps between initial data and ending claim. We find it associated with advantages to comparative advantage cases, with counterplan advantages. with disadvantages, permutation and impact turnarounds, some kritik implications. and even probabilistic topicality arguments. In practice, these often are not only extended arguments. they are causal arguments using mini-max reasoning. Mini-max reasoning is defined as an extended argument in which an infinitesimally probable event of high consequence is assumed to present a highly consequential risk. Such arguments, also known as low probability high-consequence arguments, are commonly associated with "risk analysis” The opening statement from Schell represents a quintessential mini-max argument. Schell asked his readers to ignore probability assessment and focus exclusively on the impact of his claim. While Schell gave very specific reasons why probability is less important than impact in resolving this claim, his arguments are not impervious to rebuttal. What was a knotty piece of evidence in the 1980s kick-started a practice in contest debating which currently is evident in the ubiquitous political capital disadvantage codenamed "Clinton." Here is an example of the Clinton disadvantage. In theory, plan action causes some tradeoff (real or imaginary) that either increases or decreases the President's ability to execute a particular agenda. Debaters have argued the following: Clinton (soon to be Gore or Bush) needs to focus on foreign affairs. A recent agreement between Barak and Assad needs presidential stewardship. The affirmative plan shifts presidential focus to Nigeria that trades off with focus on the Middle East. As a result. the deal for the return of the Golan Heights to Syria fails. Violence and conflict ensues as Hizbollah terrorists launch guerilla attacks into northern Israel from Lebanon. Israel strikes back. Hizbollah incursions increase. Chemical terrorism ensues and Israel attacks Hizbollah strongholds in southern Lebanon with tactical nuclear weapons. Iran launches chemical weapons against Tel Aviv. Iraq allies with Iran. The United States is drawn in. Superpower miscalculation results in all-out nuclear war culminating in a nuclear winter and the end of all life on the planet. This low-probability high-consequence event argument is an extended argument using mini-max reasoning. The appeal of mini-max risk arguments has heightened with the onset of on-line text retrieval services and the World Wide Web, both of which allow debaters to search for particular words or word strings with relative ease. Extended arguments are fabricated by linking evidence in which a word or word string serves as the common denominator, much in the fashion of the sorities (stacked syllogism): A α B, B α C, C α D, therefore A α D. Prior to computerized search engines, a contest debater's search for segments that could be woven together into an extended argument was incredibly time consuming. The dead ends checked the authenticity of the extended claims by debunking especially fanciful hypotheses. Text retrieval services may have changed that. While text retrieval services include some refereed published materials, they also incorporate transcripts and wire releases that are less vigilantly checked for accuracy. The World Wide Web allows virtually anyone to set up a site and post anything at that site regardless of its veracity. Sophisticated super search engines, such as Savvy Search® help contest debaters track down particular words and phrases. Searches on text retrieval services such as Lexis-Nexis Universe® and Congressional Universe® locate words and word strings within n words of each other. Search results are collated and loomed into an extended argument. Often, evidence collected in this manner is linked together to reach a conclusion of nearly infinite impact, such as the ever-present specter of global thermonuclear war. Furthermore, too much evidence from online text retrieval services is unqualified or under-qualified. Since anyone can post a web page and since transcripts and releases are seldom checked as factual, pseudo-experts abound and are at the core of the most egregious claims in extended arguments using mini-max reasoning. In nearly every episode of fear mongering ... people with fancy titles appeared .. .. [F]or some species of scares ... secondary scholars are standard fixtures .... Statements of alarm by newscasters and glorification of wannabe experts are two telltales tricks of the fear mongers' trade. . . : the use of poignant anecdotes in place of scientific evidence, the christening of isolated incidents as trends, depictions of entire categories of people as innately dangerous .... (Glassner 206, 208) Hence, any warrant by authority of this ilk further complicates probability estimates in extended arguments using mini-max reasoning. Often the link and internal link story is the machination of the debater making the claim rather than the sources cited in the linkage. The links in the chain may be claims with different, if not inconsistent, warrants. As a result, contextual considerations can be mostly moot. Not only the information but also the way it is collated is suspect. All these engines use Boolean connectors (and, or, and not) and Boolean connectors are dubious by nature. Boolean logic uses terms only to show relationships - of inclusion or exclusion among the terms. It shows whether or not one drawer fits into another and ignores the question whether there is anything in the drawers. . . . The Boolean search shows the characteristic way that we put questions to the world of information. When we pose a question to the Boolean world, we use keywords, buzzwords, and thought bits to scan the vast store of knowledge. Keeping an abstract, cybernetic distance from the source of knowledge, we set up tiny funnels .... But even if we build our tunnels carefully, we still remain essentially tunnel dwellers. Thinking itself happens only when we suspend the inner musings of the mind long enough to favor a momentary precision, and even then thinking belongs to musing as a subset of our creative mind. . . . The Boolean reader, on the contrary, knows in advance where the exits are, the on-ramps, and the well-marked rest stops. . . . The pathways of thought, not to mention the logic of thoughts, disappear under a Boolean arrangement of freeways." (Heim 18, 22-25) Heim worries that the Boolean search may encourage readers to link together nearly empty drawers of information, stifling imaginative, creative thinking and substituting empty ideas for good reasons. The problems worsen when researchers select word strings without reading its full context, a nearly universal practice among contest debaters. Using these computerized research services, debaters are easily able to build extended mini-max arguments ending in Armageddon. Outsiders to contest debating have remarked simply that too many policy debate arguments end in all-out nuclear war: consequently, they categorize the activity as foolish. How many times have educators had contest debaters in a classroom discussion who strung out an extended mini-max argument to the jeers and guffaws of their classmates? They cannot all be wrong. Frighteningly enough, most of us agree. We should not ignore Charles Richet's adage: "The stupid man is not the one who does not understand something - but the man who understands it well enough yet acts as if he didn't" (Tabori 6). Regrettably, mini-max arguments are not the exclusive domain of contest debating. "Policies driven by the consideration of low risk probabilities will, on the whole, lead to low investment strategies to prevent a hazard from being realized or to mitigate the hazard's consequences. By comparison, policies driven by the consideration of high consequences, despite low probabilities, will lead to high levels of public investment" (Nehnevajsa 521). Regardless of their persuasiveness, Bashor and others have discovered that mini-max claims are not useful in resolving complex issues. For example, in his assessment of low probability, potentially high-consequence events such as terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, Bashor found simple estimates of potential losses added little to contingency planning. While adding little to policy analysis, extended arguments using mini-max reasoning remain powerful determinants of resource allocation. As such, they need to be debunked. Experts agree. For example, Slavic advocates a better understanding of all risk analysis since it drives much of our public policy. "Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand. If risk is defined one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the best. If it is defined another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics or other contextual factors, one will likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is thus an exercise in power" (699). When probability assessments are eliminated from risk calculi, as is the case in mini-max risk arguments, it is a political act, and all political acts need to be scrutinized with a critical lens.

#### The WTO kills people and exacerbates hunger, poverty, and disease by trampling on smaller underdeveloped countries

Global Exchange 13 (no author, Global Exchange - international human rights organization dedicated to promoting social, economic and environmental justice around the world “Top Reasons to Oppose the WTO” http://www.globalexchange.org/resources/wto/oppose)

6. The WTO is Killing People¶ The WTO’s fierce defense of ‘Trade Related Intellectual Property’ rights (TRIPs)—patents, copyrights and trademarks—comes at the expense of health and human lives. The WTO has protected for pharmaceutical companies’ ‘right to profit’ against governments seeking to protect their people’s health by providing lifesaving medicines in countries in areas like sub-saharan Africa, where thousands die every day from HIV/AIDS. Developing countries won an important victory in 2001 when they affirmed the right to produce generic drugs (or import them if they lacked production capacity), so that they could provide essential lifesaving medicines to their populations less expensively. Unfortunately, in September 2003, many new conditions were agreed to that will make it more difficult for countries to produce those drugs. Once again, the WTO demonstrates that it favors corporate profit over saving human lives.¶ 7. The WTO is Increasing Inequality¶ Free trade is not working for the majority of the world. During the most recent period of rapid growth in global trade and investment (1960 to 1998) inequality worsened both internationally and within countries. The UN Development Program reports that the richest 20 percent of the world’s population consume 86 percent of the world’s resources while the poorest 80 percent consume just 14 percent. WTO rules have hastened these trends by opening up countries to foreign investment and thereby making it easier for production to go where the labor is cheapest and most easily exploited and environmental costs are low.¶ 8. The WTO is Increasing Hunger¶ Farmers produce enough food in the world to feed everyone – yet because of corporate control of food distribution, as many as 800 million people worldwide suffer from chronic malnutrition. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, food is a human right. In developing countries, as many as four out of every five people make their living from the land. But the leading principle in the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture is that market forces should control agricultural policies-rather than a national commitment to guarantee food security and maintain decent family farmer incomes. WTO policies have allowed dumping of heavily subsidized industrially produced food into poor countries, undermining local production and increasing hunger.¶ 9. The WTO Hurts Poor, Small Countries in Favor of Rich Powerful Nations¶ The WTO supposedly operates on a consensus basis, with equal decision-making power for all. In reality, many important decisions get made in a process whereby poor countries’ negotiators are not even invited to closed door meetings – and then ‘agreements’ are announced that poor countries didn’t even know were being discussed. Many countries do not even have enough trade personnel to participate in all the negotiations or to even have a permanent representative at the WTO. This severely disadvantages poor countries from representing their interests. Likewise, many countries are too poor to defend themselves from WTO challenges from the rich countries, and change their laws rather than pay for their own defense.¶ 10. The WTO Undermines Local Level Decision-Making and National Sovereignty¶ The WTO’s “most favored nation” provision requires all WTO member countries to treat each other equally and to treat all corporations from these countries equally regardless of their track record. Local policies aimed at rewarding companies who hire local residents, use domestic materials, or adopt environmentally sound practices are essentially illegal under the WTO. Developing countries are prohibited from creating local laws that developed countries once pursued, such as protecting new, domestic industries until they can be internationally competitive. California Governor Gray Davis vetoed a “Buy California” bill that would have granted a small preference to local businesses because it was WTO-illegal. Conforming with the WTO required entire sections of US laws to be rewritten. Many countries are even changing their laws and constitutions in anticipation of potential future WTO rulings and negotiations.

#### Disease are short term – They evolve to be benign.

AMNH 98 The American Museum of Natural History “How did Hyperdisease cause extinctions?” http://www.amnh.org/science/biodiversity/extinction/Day1/disease/Bit2.html

It is well known that lethal diseases can have a profound effect on species' population size and structure. However, it is generally accepted that the principal populational effects of disease are acute--that is, short-term. In other words, although a species many suffer substantial loss from the effects of a given highly infectious disease at a given time, the facts indicate that natural populations tend to bounce back after the period of high losses. Thus, disease as a primary cause of extinction seems implausible. However, this is the normal case, where the disease-provoking pathogen and its host have had a long relationship. Ordinarily, it is not in the pathogens interest to rapidly kill off large numbers of individuals in its host species, because that might imperil its own survival. Disease theorists long ago expressed the idea that pathogens tend to evolve toward a "benign" state of affairs with their hosts, which means in practice that they continue to infect, but tend not to kill (or at least not rapidly). A very good reason for suspecting this to be an accurate view of pathogen-host relationships is that individuals with few or no genetic defenses against a particular pathogen will be maintained within the host population, thus ensuring the pathogen's ultimate survival.

#### 2. No terminal impact – Too fast or too slow.

The Independent 03 “Future Tense: Is Mankind Doomed?” http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0725-04.htm

Maybe - though plenty of experienced graduate students could already have a stab. But nature knows that infectious diseases are very hard to get right. Only HIV/Aids has 100 per cent mortality, and takes a long time to achieve it. By definition, lethal diseases kill their host. If they kill too quickly, they aren't passed on; if too slowly, we can detect them and isolate the infected. Any mutant smallpox or other handmade germ would certainly be too deadly or too mild. And even SARS killed fewer people worldwide than die on Britain's roads in a week. As scares go, this one is ideal - overblown and unrealistic.

#### 3. No risk of big impact – Quarantines check.

Pharma Investments, Ventures & Law Weekly 05 “SARS; Quarantine is cost saving and effective in containing emerging infections” Lexis

Quarantine is cost saving and effective in containing emerging infections. "Over time, quarantine has become a classic public health intervention and has been used repeatedly when newly emerging infectious diseases have threatened to spread throughout a population. "Here, we weigh the economic costs and benefits associated with implementing widespread quarantine in Toronto during the SARS outbreaks of 2003," scientists writing in the Journal of Infection report. "We compared the costs of two outbreak scenarios: in Scenario A, SARS is able to transmit itself throughout a population without any significant public health interventions. In Scenario B, quarantine is implemented early on in an attempt to contain the virus. "By evaluating these situations, we can investigate whether or not the use of quarantine is justified by being either cost-saving, life saving, or both," wrote A.G. Gupta and colleagues at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. "Our results indicate that quarantine is effective in containing newly emerging infectious diseases, and also cost saving when compared to not implementing a widespread containment mechanism," the authors said. Gupta concluded, "This paper illustrates that it is not only in our humanitarian interest for public health and healthcare officials to remain aggressive in their response to newly emerging infections, but also in our collective economic interest. Despite somewhat daunting initial costs, quarantine saves both lives and money." Gupta and colleagues published their study in the Journal of Infection (The economic impact of quarantine: SARS in Toronto as a case study. J Infect, 2005;50(5):386-393).